English

No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions

Computer Science and Game Theory 2025-10-21 v1

Abstract

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal O~(T)\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T}) regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains O~(T3/4)\widetilde{O}(T^{3/4}) regret bound.

Keywords

Cite

@article{arxiv.2510.16869,
  title  = {No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions},
  author = {Yuan Deng and Yilin Li and Wei Tang and Hanrui Zhang},
  journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.16869},
  year   = {2025}
}

Comments

12 pages (main); appendix included. Conference version to appear in the proceeding of the 39th Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS'25)