Related papers: Behavioral Study of Dashboard Mechanisms
In display advertising, advertisers want to achieve a marketing objective with constraints on budget and cost-per-outcome. This is usually formulated as an optimization problem that maximizes the total utility under constraints. The…
Data visualizations are standard tools for assessing and communicating risks. However, it is not always clear which designs are optimal or how encoding choices might influence risk perception and decision-making. In this paper, we report…
We advance empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2020, arXiv:1907.12408) of the winner-bid and loser-bid auctions for the dissolution of a partnership. We show, in a complete information environment, that even though these…
Data visualizations are standard tools for assessing and communicating risks. However, it is not always clear which designs are optimal or how encoding choices might influence risk perception and decision-making. In this paper, we report…
Mechanism design, a branch of economics, aims to design rules that can autonomously achieve desired outcomes in resource allocation and public decision making. The research on mechanism design using machine learning is called automated…
We study the impact of end-user behavior on service provider (SP) bidding and user/network association in a HetNet with multiple SPs while considering the uncertainty in the service guarantees offered by the SPs. Using Prospect Theory (PT)…
Today, many auctions are carried out with the help of intermediary platforms like Google and eBay. We refer to such auctions as platform-assisted auctions.Traditionally, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions…
Visualization research often focuses on perceptual accuracy or helping readers interpret key messages. However, we know very little about how chart designs might influence readers' perceptions of the people behind the data. Specifically,…
The majority of online marketplaces offer promotion programs to sellers to acquire additional customers for their products. These programs typically allow sellers to allocate advertising budgets to promote their products, with higher…
Sponsored search positions are typically allocated through real-time auctions, where the outcomes depend on advertisers' quality-adjusted bids - the product of their bids and quality scores. Although quality scoring helps promote ads with…
We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the…
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition.…
Game theory has been developed by scientists as a theory of strategic interaction among players who are supposed to be perfectly rational. These strategic interactions might have been presented in an auction, a business negotiation, a chess…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
Dashboards, which comprise multiple views on a single display, help analyze and communicate multiple perspectives of data simultaneously. However, creating effective and elegant dashboards is challenging since it requires careful and…
Understanding citizens' values in participatory systems is crucial for citizen-centric policy-making. We envision a hybrid participatory system where participants make choices and provide motivations for those choices, and AI agents…
We study auction design in a setting where agents can communicate over a censorship-resistant broadcast channel like the ones we can implement over a public blockchain. We seek to design credible, strategyproof auctions in a model that…
A large fraction of online advertisement is sold via repeated second price auctions. In these auctions, the reserve price is the main tool for the auctioneer to boost revenues. In this work, we investigate the following question: Can…
We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider models of agent behaviour in which they either…
Randomized mechanisms, which map a set of bids to a probability distribution over outcomes rather than a single outcome, are an important but ill-understood area of computational mechanism design. We investigate the role of randomized…