Related papers: Divide or Confer: Aggregating Information without …

Here we focus on the description of the mechanisms behind the process of information aggregation and decision making, a basic step to understand emergent phenomena in society, such as trends, information spreading or the wisdom of crowds.…

In multi-item screening, optimal selling mechanisms are challenging to characterize and implement, even with full knowledge of valuation distributions. In this paper, we aim to develop tractable, interpretable, and implementable mechanisms…

This work considers a problem of integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) in which the goal of sensing is to detect a binary state. Unlike most approaches that minimize the total detection error probability, in our work, we disaggregate…

We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…

Although peer prediction markets are widely used in crowdsourcing to aggregate information from agents, they often fail to reward the participating agents equitably. Honest agents can be wrongly penalized if randomly paired with dishonest…

A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…

In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…

We consider a basic communication and sensing setup comprising a transmitter, a receiver and a sensor. The transmitter sends an encoded sequence to the receiver through a discrete memoryless channel, and the receiver is interested in…

A communication setup is considered where a transmitter wishes to simultaneously sense its channel state and convey a message to a receiver. The state is estimated at the transmitter by means of generalized feedback, i.e. a strictly causal…

A sender with private preferences would like to influence a receiver's action by providing information through a statistical test. The technology for information production is controlled by a monopolist intermediary, who offers a menu of…

Large data sets often require performing distributed statistical estimation, with a full data set split across multiple machines and limited communication between machines. To study such scenarios, we define and study some refinements of…

In this paper we propose and analyze a distributed algorithm for achieving globally optimal decisions, either estimation or detection, through a self-synchronization mechanism among linearly coupled integrators initialized with local…

We compare how well agents aggregate information in two repeated social learning environments. In the first setting agents have access to a public data set. In the second they have access to the same data, and also to the past actions of…

We design a mechanism for Fair and Efficient Distribution of Resources (FEDoR) in the presence of strategic agents. We consider a multiple-instances, Bayesian setting, where in each round the preference of an agent over the set of resources…

We consider a cascade network where a sequence of nodes each send a message to their downstream neighbor to enable coordination, the first node having access to an information signal. An adversary also receives all of the communication as…

Aggregating signals from a collection of noisy sources is a fundamental problem in many domains including crowd-sourcing, multi-agent planning, sensor networks, signal processing, voting, ensemble learning, and federated learning. The core…

How do social animals make effective decisions in the absence of a leader? While coordination can improve accuracy, it also introduces delays as information propagates through the group. In changing environments, these delays can outweigh…

I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal…

A key issue in the control of distributed discrete systems modeled as Markov decisions processes, is that often the state of the system is not directly observable at any single location in the system. The participants in the control scheme…

Decades of research suggest that information exchange in groups and organizations can reliably improve judgment accuracy in tasks such as financial forecasting, market research, and medical decision-making. However, we show that improving…