Related papers: Robust Tournaments
The goal in this paper is to approximate the Price of Stability (PoS) in stochastic Nash games using stochastic approximation (SA) schemes. PoS is amongst the most popular metrics in game theory and provides an avenue for estimating the…
Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g. uninsurable labor…
We study the inefficiency of equilibria for various classes of games when players are (partially) altruistic. We model altruistic behavior by assuming that player i's perceived cost is a convex combination of 1-\alpha_i times his direct…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
We introduce Random Reward Perturbation (RRP), a novel exploration strategy for reinforcement learning (RL). Our theoretical analyses demonstrate that adding zero-mean noise to environmental rewards effectively enhances policy diversity…
Robustness to mutations and noise has been shown to evolve through stabilizing selection for optimal phenotypes in model gene regulatory networks. The ability to evolve robust mutants is known to depend on the network architecture. How do…
Competitor rating systems for head-to-head games are typically used to measure playing strength from game outcomes. Ratings computed from these systems are often used to select top competitors for elite events, for pairing players of…
Drafts are sequential round-robin allocation procedures for distributing heterogeneous and indivisible objects among agents subject to some priority order (e.g., allocating players' contract rights to teams in professional sports leagues).…
Strategic uncertainty complicates policy design in coordination games. To rein in strategic uncertainty, the Planner in this paper connects the problem of policy design to that of equilibrium selection. We characterize the subsidy scheme…
Networks with a given degree distribution may be very resilient to one type of failure or attack but not to another. The goal of this work is to determine network design guidelines which maximize the robustness of networks to both random…
Rank-order coding, a form of temporal coding, has emerged as a promising scheme to explain the rapid ability of the mammalian brain. Owing to its speed as well as efficiency, rank-order coding is increasingly gaining interest in diverse…
Crucial to an Evolutionary Algorithm's performance is its selection scheme. We mathematically investigate the relation between polynomial rank and probabilistic tournament methods which are (respectively) generalisations of the popular…
This paper studies Markov Decision Processes under parameter uncertainty. We adapt the distributionally robust optimization framework, and assume that the uncertain parameters are random variables following an unknown distribution, and…
In many competitive settings, from education to politics, rules do not reward effort evenly, and thresholds (e.g., grade cutoffs or electoral majorities) make some moments disproportionately important. Success thus depends on efficiently…
We explore a new way to evaluate generative models using insights from evaluation of competitive games between human players. We show experimentally that tournaments between generators and discriminators provide an effective way to evaluate…
We consider two-player random extensive form games where the payoffs at the leaves are independently drawn uniformly at random from a given feasible set C. We study the asymptotic distribution of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for…
We introduce a natural variant of weighted voting games, which we refer to as k-Prize Weighted Voting Games. Such games consist of n players with weights, and k prizes, of possibly differing values. The players form coalitions, and the i-th…
We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers' information structure about the common value. We use linear…
The paper discusses the strategy-proofness of sports tournaments with multiple group stages, where the results of matches already played in the previous round against teams in the same group are carried over. These tournaments, widely used…
We consider the problem of designing network cost-sharing protocols with good equilibria under uncertainty. The underlying game is a multicast game in a rooted undirected graph with nonnegative edge costs. A set of k terminal vertices or…