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A matching game is a cooperative profit game defined on an edge-weighted graph, where the players are the vertices and the profit of a coalition is the maximum weight of matchings in the subgraph induced by the coalition. A population…
A game-theoretic model for the study of dynamic networks is analyzed. The model is motivated by communication networks that are subject to failure of nodes and where the restoration needs resources. The corresponding two-player game is…
This paper considers a networked aggregative game (NAG) where the players are distributed over a communication network. By only communicating with a subset of players, the goal of each player in the NAG is to minimize an individual cost…
Imitation dynamics for population games are studied and their asymptotic properties analyzed. In the considered class of imitation dynamics - that encompass the replicator equation as well as other models previously considered in…
We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…
Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the information desired while replies can deliver the required information. However, time limitations often force…
We consider a finite horizon repeated game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions, which are publicly observed. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In each period,…
Deception plays a critical role in many interactions in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models called "cheap talk signaling games" capture the dynamic and information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But…
Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…
In two player bi-matrix games with partial monitoring, actions played are not observed, only some messages are received. Those games satisfy a crucial property of usual bi-matrix games: there are only a finite number of required (mixed)…
We investigate how distorted, yet structured, beliefs can persist in strategic situations. Specifically, we study two-player games in which each player is endowed with a biased-belief function that represents the discrepancy between a…
We study a repeated sender-receiver game where inspections are public but the sender's action is hidden unless inspected. A detected deception ends the relationship or triggers a finite punishment. We show the public state is one…
In this paper we study collective decision making on a multi-population, represented by a regular network of groups of individuals. Each group consists of a collection of players and every player can choose between two options. A group is…
In~[1],authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric information, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player observes its own type perfectly and actions of all…
We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…
Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…
This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…
The ways in which an innovation (e.g., new behaviour, idea, technology, product) diffuses among people can determine its success or failure. In this paper, we address the problem of diffusion of innovations over multiplex social networks…
In a zero-sum stochastic game with signals, at each stage, two adversary players take decisions and receive a stage payoff determined by these decisions and a variable called state. The state follows a Markov chain, that is controlled by…
An important feature of a dynamic game is its monitoring structure namely, what the players effectively see from the played actions. We consider games with arbitrary monitoring structures. One of the purposes of this paper is to know to…