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This paper examines the structural controllability for a group of agents, called followers, connected to each other based on the consensus law under commands of multiple leaders, which are agents with superior capabilities, over a fixed…
We consider a class of Mean Field Games in which the agents may interact through the statistical distribution of their states and controls. It is supposed that the Hamiltonian behaves like a power of its arguments as they tend to infinity,…
Evolutionary game dynamics with two 2-strategy games in a finite population has been investigated in this study. Traditionally, frequency-dependent evolutionary dynamics are modeled by deterministic replicator dynamics under the assumption…
We study binary-action pairwise-separable network games that encompass both coordinating and anti-coordinating behaviors. Our model is grounded in an underlying directed signed graph, where each link is associated with a weight that…
Combinatorial Game Theory is a branch of mathematics and theoretical computer science that studies sequential 2-player games with perfect information. Normal play is the convention where a player who cannot move loses. Here, we generalize…
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium reflects the collective stability of some individual strategies chosen by selfish agents. The concept pertains to different classes of games, e.g. the sequential games, where the agents play…
Chess is an emblematic sport that stands out because of its age, popularity and complexity. It has served to study human behavior from the perspective of a wide number of disciplines, from cognitive skills such as memory and learning, to…
The effect of population heterogeneity in multi-agent learning is practically relevant but remains far from being well-understood. Motivated by this, we introduce a model of multi-population learning that allows for heterogeneous beliefs…
Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. Successful deception is characterized by the information-asymmetric, dynamic, and strategic behaviors of the deceiver and the deceivee.…
In this paper we investigate lossy channel games under incomplete information, where two players operate on a finite set of unbounded FIFO channels and one player, representing a system component under consideration operates under…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
Something is definitely wrong. If the game has a linear winning strategy, then it is tractable. What's going on? Well, we describe a two-person game which has a definite winner, that is, a player who can force a win in a finite number of…
The mean field games (MFG) paradigm was introduced to provide tractable approximations of games involving very large populations. The theory typically rests on two key assumptions: homogeneity, meaning that all players share the same…
Network creation games have been extensively studied, both from economists and computer scientists, due to their versatility in modeling individual-based community formation processes, which in turn are the theoretical counterpart of…
Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…
Zeckendorf proved that every positive integer $n$ can be written uniquely as the sum of non-adjacent Fibonacci numbers; a similar result, though with a different notion of a legal decomposition, holds for many other sequences. We use these…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic epistemic…
We present a new multiplayer game model for the interaction and the flow of information in a distributed system. The players are tokens on a Petri net. As long as the players move in independent parts of the net, they do not know of each…
We show that the problem of deciding whether in a multi-player perfect information recursive game (i.e. a stochastic game with terminal rewards) there exists a stationary Nash equilibrium ensuring each player a certain payoff is Existential…