Related papers: A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network G…

We study infinitely repeated games in settings of imperfect monitoring. We first prove a family of theorems that show that when the signals observed by the players satisfy a condition known as $(\epsilon, \gamma)$-differential privacy, that…

Cooperation through repetition is an important theme in game theory. In this regard, various celebrated ``folk theorems'' have been proposed for repeated games in increasingly more complex environments. There has, however, been insufficient…

I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players endogenously decide whether to disclose signals about their past actions. I establish an-anti folk theorem, that when players are sufficiently long-lived, they will almost…

We study the problem of computing an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in repeated games. Earlier work by Borgs et al. [2010] suggests that this problem is intractable. We show that if we make a slight change to their model---modeling the players…

Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied, however…

This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and private signal about the other's actions (private monitoring…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

In evolutionary game theory, evolutionarily stable states are characterised by the folk theorem because exact solutions to the replicator equation are difficult to obtain. It is generally assumed that the folk theorem, which is the…

This paper considers a game-theoretic formulation of the covert communications problem with finite blocklength, where the transmitter (Alice) can randomly vary her transmit power in different blocks, while the warden (Willie) can randomly…

The very notion of social network implies that linked individuals interact repeatedly with each other. This allows them not only to learn successful strategies and adapt to them, but also to condition their own behavior on the behavior of…

This paper studies social interactions in a game theoretic model with players in a large social network. We consider observations from one single equilibrium of a large network game with asymmetric information, in which each player chooses…

Following the Bayesian communication learning paradigm, we propose a finite population learning concept to capture the level of information aggregation in any given network, where agents are allowed to communicate with neighbors repeatedly…

We consider a scenario where $N$ users send packets to a common access point. The receiver decodes the message of each user by treating the other user's signals as noise. Associated with each user is its channel state and a finite queue…

In studies of social dynamics, cohesion refers to a group's tendency to stay in unity, which -- as argued in sociometry -- arises from the network topology of interpersonal ties between members of the group. We follow this idea and propose…

We explore the behaviour emerging from learning agents repeatedly interacting strategically for a wide range of learning dynamics, including $Q$-learning, projected gradient, replicator and log-barrier dynamics. Going beyond the better…

This paper studies two-player zero-sum repeated Bayesian games in which every player has a private type that is unknown to the other player, and the initial probability of the type of every player is publicly known. The types of players are…

In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…

In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…

This paper investigates the Nash equilibrium seeking problems for networked games with intermittent communication, where each player is capable of communicating with other players intermittently over a strongly connected and directed graph.…