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We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in…
In this work, we introduce the concept of non-negative weighted regret, an extension of non-negative regret \cite{anagnostides2022last} in games. Investigating games with non-negative weighted regret helps us to understand games with…
This paper considers repeated games in which one player has more information about the game than the other players. In particular, we investigate repeated two-player zero-sum games where only the column player knows the payoff matrix A of…
This study raises and addresses the problem of time-delayed feedback in learning in games. Because learning in games assumes that multiple agents independently learn their strategies, a discrepancy in optimization often emerges among the…
Regret minimization has proved to be a versatile tool for tree-form sequential decision making and extensive-form games. In large two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games, modern extensions of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR)…
No-regret learning has a long history of being closely connected to game theory. Recent works have devised uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that, when adopted by all the players in normal-form games, converge to various equilibrium…
While single-agent policy optimization in a fixed environment has attracted a lot of research attention recently in the reinforcement learning community, much less is known theoretically when there are multiple agents playing in a…
Motivated by alternating learning dynamics in two-player games, a recent work by Cevher et al.(2024) shows that $o(\sqrt{T})$ alternating regret is possible for any $T$-round adversarial Online Linear Optimization (OLO) problem, and left as…
This paper presents a new framework for analyzing and designing no-regret algorithms for dynamic (possibly adversarial) systems. The proposed framework generalizes the popular online convex optimization framework and extends it to its…
We revisit the Follow the Regularized Leader (FTRL) framework for Online Convex Optimization (OCO) over compact sets, focusing on achieving dynamic regret guarantees. Prior work has highlighted the framework's limitations in dynamic…
We revisit the problem of solving two-player zero-sum games in the decentralized setting. We propose a simple algorithmic framework that simultaneously achieves the best rates for honest regret as well as adversarial regret, and in addition…
We consider regret minimization in repeated games with non-convex loss functions. Minimizing the standard notion of regret is computationally intractable. Thus, we define a natural notion of regret which permits efficient optimization and…
A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a game, each player's \emph{regret} after $T$ repetitions grows polylogarithmically in $T$, an exponential improvement over the…
We study repeated two-player games where one of the players, the learner, employs a no-regret learning strategy, while the other, the optimizer, is a rational utility maximizer. We consider general Bayesian games, where the payoffs of both…
Consider a scenario where a player chooses an action in each round $t$ out of $T$ rounds and observes the incurred cost after a delay of $d_{t}$ rounds. The cost functions and the delay sequence are chosen by an adversary. We show that in a…
Follow-The-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithms often enjoy optimal regret for adversarial as well as stochastic bandit problems and allow for a streamlined analysis. Nonetheless, FTRL algorithms require the solution of an optimization…
We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential…
Follow the regularized leader FTRL is the premier algorithm for online optimization. However, despite decades of research on its convergence in constrained optimization -- and potential games in particular -- its behavior remained hitherto…
In this paper, we investigate the power of {\it regularization}, a common technique in reinforcement learning and optimization, in solving extensive-form games (EFGs). We propose a series of new algorithms based on regularizing the payoff…
Learning in games refers to scenarios where multiple players interact in a shared environment, each aiming to minimize their regret. An equilibrium can be computed at a fast rate of $O(1/T)$ when all players follow the optimistic…