Related papers: Pointwise Convergence in Games with Conflicting In…

We study the convergence of Optimistic Gradient Descent Ascent in unconstrained bilinear games. In a first part, we consider the zero-sum case and extend previous results by Daskalakis et al. in 2018, Liang and Stokes in 2019, and others:…

This paper focuses on the online saddle point problem, which involves a sequence of two-player time-varying convex-concave games. Considering the nonstationarity of the environment, we adopt the duality gap and the dynamic Nash equilibrium…

We study the problem of online learning with non-convex losses, where the learner has access to an offline optimization oracle. We show that the classical Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) algorithm achieves optimal regret rate of…

We present an algorithm which attains O(\sqrt{T}) internal (and thus external) regret for finite games with partial monitoring under the local observability condition. Recently, this condition has been shown by (Bartok, Pal, and Szepesvari,…

We consider the problem of minimizing different notions of swap regret in online optimization. These forms of regret are tightly connected to correlated equilibrium concepts in games, and have been more recently shown to guarantee…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

Bayesian games model interactive decision-making where players have incomplete information -- e.g., regarding payoffs and private data on players' strategies and preferences -- and must actively reason and update their belief models (with…

We suggest a general method for inferring players' values from their actions in repeated games. The method extends and improves upon the recent suggestion of (Nekipelov et al., EC 2015) and is based on the assumption that players are more…

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is a family of iterative algorithms that are the most popular and, in practice, fastest approach to approximately solving large imperfect-information games. In this paper we introduce novel CFR…

Counterfactual regret minimization is a family of algorithms of no-regret learning dynamics capable of solving large-scale imperfect information games. We propose implementing this algorithm as a series of dense and sparse matrix and vector…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…

We study how to learn $\epsilon$-optimal strategies in zero-sum imperfect information games (IIG) with trajectory feedback. In this setting, players update their policies sequentially based on their observations over a fixed number of…

Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the…

Designing efficient algorithms to compute Nash equilibria poses considerable challenges in Algorithmic Game Theory and Optimization. In this work, we employ integer programming techniques to compute Nash equilibria in Integer Programming…

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to…

This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…

Games are natural models for multi-agent machine learning settings, such as generative adversarial networks (GANs). The desirable outcomes from algorithmic interactions in these games are encoded as game theoretic equilibrium concepts, e.g.…

We study online learning and equilibrium computation in games with polyhedral decision sets, a property shared by both normal-form games and extensive-form games (EFGs), when the learning agent is restricted to using a best-response oracle.…

This paper investigates the challenge of learning in black-box games, where the underlying utility function is unknown to any of the agents. While there is an extensive body of literature on the theoretical analysis of algorithms for…