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Non-cooperative games serve as a powerful framework for capturing the interactions among self-interested players and have broad applicability in modeling a wide range of practical scenarios, ranging from power management to drug delivery.…
This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both…
We develop a novel and generic algorithm for the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem (or more generally the combinatorial semi-bandit problem). When instantiated differently, our algorithm achieves various new data-dependent regret…
We introduce an online learning algorithm in the bandit feedback model that, once adopted by all agents of a congestion game, results in game-dynamics that converge to an $\epsilon$-approximate Nash Equilibrium in a polynomial number of…
Recently, invariant risk minimization (IRM) (Arjovsky et al.) was proposed as a promising solution to address out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization. In Ahuja et al., it was shown that solving for the Nash equilibria of a new class of…
In a recent series of papers it has been established that variants of Gradient Descent/Ascent and Mirror Descent exhibit last iterate convergence in convex-concave zero-sum games. Specifically, \cite{DISZ17, LiangS18} show last iterate…
Our work focuses on extra gradient learning algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in bilinear zero-sum games. The proposed method, which can be formally considered as a variant of Optimistic Mirror Descent…
We study the problem of minimizing swap regret in structured normal-form games. Players have a very large (potentially infinite) number of pure actions, but each action has an embedding into $d$-dimensional space and payoffs are given by…
An $\alpha$-potential game is a multi-player non-cooperative interaction in which a global potential function approximates individual player rewards up to a structural bias $\alpha$. While identifying a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in generic…
We study the problem of incentive-compatible online learning with bandit feedback. In this class of problems, the experts are self-interested agents who might misrepresent their preferences with the goal of being selected most often. The…
The convergence of online learning algorithms in games under self-play is a fundamental question in game theory and machine learning. Among various notions of convergence, last-iterate convergence is particularly desirable, as it reflects…
In this paper, we provide exponential rates of convergence to the interior Nash equilibrium for continuous-time dual-space game dynamics such as mirror descent (MD) and actor-critic (AC). We perform our analysis in $N$-player continuous…
We study infinite-horizon discounted two-player zero-sum Markov games, and develop a decentralized algorithm that provably converges to the set of Nash equilibria under self-play. Our algorithm is based on running an Optimistic Gradient…
We study the problem of repeated play in a zero-sum game in which the payoff matrix may change, in a possibly adversarial fashion, on each round; we call these Online Matrix Games. Finding the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of a two player zero-sum…
Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)} is the popular method for finding approximate Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games with imperfect information. CFR solves games by travsersing the full game tree iteratively, which limits…
The congestion game is a powerful model that encompasses a range of engineering systems such as traffic networks and resource allocation. It describes the behavior of a group of agents who share a common set of $F$ facilities and take…
We consider reinforcement learning in an environment modeled by an episodic, finite, stage-dependent Markov decision process of horizon $H$ with $S$ states, and $A$ actions. The performance of an agent is measured by the regret after…
Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an effective algorithm for solving extensive games with imperfect information (IIEGs). However, CFR is only allowed to be applied in known environments, where the transition function of the chance…
Solving strategic games with huge action space is a critical yet under-explored topic in economics, operations research and artificial intelligence. This paper proposes new learning algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum normal-form…
Stochastically Extended Adversarial (SEA) model is introduced by Sachs et al. [2022] as an interpolation between stochastic and adversarial online convex optimization. Under the smoothness condition, they demonstrate that the expected…