Related papers: On Signed Network Coordination Games
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
Contemporary applications of machine learning in two-team e-sports and the superior expressivity of multi-agent generative adversarial networks raise important and overlooked theoretical questions regarding optimization in two-team games.…
We consider two classes of constrained finite state-action stochastic games. First, we consider a two player nonzero sum single controller constrained stochastic game with both average and discounted cost criterion. We consider the same…
This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…
In this paper we analyse two-player games by their response graphs. The response graph has nodes which are strategy profiles, with an arc between profiles if they differ in the strategy of a single player, with the direction of the arc…
We introduce a new class of context dependent, incomplete information games to serve as structured prediction models for settings with significant strategic interactions. Our games map the input context to outcomes by first condensing the…
This paper investigates Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems for noncooperative games over multi-players networks with finite bandwidth communication. A distributed quantized algorithm is presented, which consists of local gradient play,…
We propose a signed network formation game, in which pairs of individuals strategically change the signs of the edges in a complete network. These individuals are members of a social network who strategically reduce cognitive dissonances by…
We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph $G(n,p)$. Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of…
We consider the problem of computing Nash Equilibria of action-graph games (AGGs). AGGs, introduced by Bhat and Leyton-Brown, is a succinct representation of games that encapsulates both "local" dependencies as in graphical games, and…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
We study a novel control problem in the context of network coordination games: the individuation of the smallest set of players capable of driving the system, globally, from one Nash equilibrium to another one. Our main contribution is the…
This paper considers dyadic-exchange networks in which individual agents autonomously form coalitions of size two and agree on how to split a transferable utility. Valid results for this game include stable (if agents have no unilateral…
An extensive literature in economics and social science addresses contests, in which players compete to outperform each other on some measurable criterion, often referred to as a player's score, or output. Players incur costs that are an…
Coordination in multiplayer games enables players to avoid the lose-lose outcome that often arises at Nash equilibria. However, designing a coordination mechanism typically requires the consideration of the joint actions of all players,…
We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We study the existence of equilibria that are resilient to coalitional deviations of unbounded and bounded size (i.e., strong…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
Elucidating the mechanisms that lead to cooperation is still one of the main scientific challenges of current times, as many common cooperative scenarios remain elusive and at odds with Darwin's natural selection theory. Here, we study…
In this paper we consider the problem of distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking over networks, a setting in which players have limited local information. We start from a continuous-time gradient-play dynamics that converges to an NE…