Related papers: Optimal Prize Design in Parallel Rank-order Contes…
We study how increasing competition, by making prizes more unequal, affects effort in contests. In a finite type-space environment, we characterize the equilibrium, analyze the effect of competition under linear costs, and identify…
The all-pay auction, a classic competitive model, is widely applied in scenarios such as political elections, sports competitions, and research and development, where all participants pay their bids regardless of winning or losing. However,…
Probabilistic model checking for stochastic games enables formal verification of systems that comprise competing or collaborating entities operating in a stochastic environment. Despite good progress in the area, existing approaches focus…
In a multi-battle contest, each time a player competes by investing some of her budgets or resources in a component battle to collect a value if winning the battle. There are multiple battles to fight, and the budgets get consumed over…
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium outcomes are characterized by Cheapest Signal Equilibria,…
This work considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player solves a parameterized stochastic optimization problem. In deterministic regimes, best-response schemes have been shown to be convergent under a suitable spectral property…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
The overall aim of our research is to develop techniques to reason about the equilibrium properties of multi-agent systems. We model multi-agent systems as concurrent games, in which each player is a process that is assumed to act…
This paper proposes a dynamic research contest, namely chasing contest, in which two asymmetric contestants exert costly effort to accomplish two breakthroughs. The contestants are asymmetric in that one of them is present-biased and has…
This paper studies a variant of the contest model introduced in Seel and Strack [J. Econom. Theory 148 (2013) 2033-2048]. In the Seel-Strack contest, each agent or contestant privately observes a Brownian motion, absorbed at zero, and…
In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities.…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
Shortlisting is a common and effective method for pre-selecting participants in competitive settings. To ensure fairness, a cut-off score is typically announced, allowing only contestants who exceed it to enter the contest, while others are…
Two issues of algorithmic collusion are addressed in this paper. First, we show that in a general class of symmetric games, including Prisoner's Dilemma, Bertrand competition, and any (nonlinear) mixture of first and second price auction,…
Simultaneous item auctions are simple procedures for allocating items to bidders with potentially complex preferences over different item sets. In a simultaneous auction, every bidder submits bids on all items simultaneously. The allocation…
We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…
This paper establishes the equivalence between synchronous and asynchronous coordination mechanisms in dynamic games with strategic complementarities and common interests. Synchronous coordination, characterized by simultaneous commitments,…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…
We consider multi-agent decision making, where each agent optimizes its cost function subject to constraints. Agents' actions belong to a compact convex Euclidean space and the agents' cost functions are coupled. We propose a distributed…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…