Related papers: Optimal Prize Design in Parallel Rank-order Contes…
The multi-cluster games are addressed in this paper, where all players team up with the players in the cluster that they belong to, and compete against the players in other clusters to minimize the cost function of their own cluster. The…
We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the…
This paper addresses the problem of fair equilibrium selection in graphical games. Our approach is based on the data structure called the {\em best response policy}, which was proposed by Kearns et al. \cite{kls} as a way to represent all…
A multi-player competitive Dynkin stopping game is constructed. Each player can either exit the game for a fixed payoff, determined a priori, or stay and receive an adjusted payoff depending on the decision of other players. The single…
This paper studies a class of network games with linear-quadratic payoffs and externalities exerted through a strictly concave interaction function. This class of game is motivated by the diminishing marginal effects with peer influences.…
Tournaments are a widely used mechanism to rank alternatives in a noisy environment. This paper investigates a fundamental issue of economics in tournament design: what is the best usage of limited resources, that is, how should the…
How can a social planner adaptively incentivize selfish agents who are learning in a strategic environment to induce a socially optimal outcome in the long run? We propose a two-timescale learning dynamics to answer this question in both…
We propose a toy model for a stochastic description of the competition between two athletes of unequal strength, whose average strength difference is represented by a parameter $d$. The athletes interact through the choice of their…
Collaborative competitions have gained popularity in the scientific and technological fields. These competitions involve defining tasks, selecting evaluation scores, and devising result verification methods. In the standard scenario,…
We consider shared workspace scenarios with humans and robots acting to achieve independent goals, termed as parallel play. We model these as general-sum games and construct a framework that utilizes the Nash equilibrium solution concept to…
The Ultimatum Game is conventionally formulated in the context of two players. Nonetheless, real-life scenarios often entail community interactions among numerous individuals. To address this, we introduce an extended version of the…
We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce…
In two-player zero-sum stochastic games, where two competing players make decisions under uncertainty, a pair of optimal strategies is traditionally described by Nash equilibrium and computed under the assumption that the players have…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
Synthesis of finite-state controllers from high-level specifications in multi-agent systems can be reduced to solving multi-player concurrent games over finite graphs. The complexity of solving such games with qualitative objectives for…
Strategic classification studies the design of a classifier robust to the manipulation of input by strategic individuals. However, the existing literature does not consider the effect of competition among individuals as induced by the…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
We consider two-stage robust optimization problems, which can be seen as games between a decision maker and an adversary. After the decision maker fixes part of the solution, the adversary chooses a scenario from a specified uncertainty…
We study optimal auction design in an independent private values environment where bidders can endogenously -- but at a cost -- improve information about their own valuations. The optimal mechanism is two-stage: at stage-1 bidders register…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…