Related papers: Location-Restricted Stable Matching
We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case,…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) involves assigning students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and the maximum number of…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known that a stable matching is unlikely to exist, but a stable…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
The stable allocation problem is a many-to-many generalization of the well-known stable marriage problem, where we seek a bipartite assignment between, say, jobs (of varying sizes) and machines (of varying capacities) that is "stable" based…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
The classical Stable Roommates problem is to decide whether there exists a matching of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their…
The Hospital Residents setting models important problems like school choice, assignment of undergraduate students to degree programs, among many others. In this setting, fixed quotas are associated with the programs that limit the number of…
We propose a numerical algorithm for computing approximately optimal solutions of the matching for teams problem. Our algorithm is efficient for problems involving large number of agent categories and allows for non-discrete agent type…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Clustering is a long-standing research problem and a fundamental tool in AI and data analysis. The traditional k-center problem, a fundamental theoretical challenge in clustering, has a best possible approximation ratio of 2, and any…
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants and employers in an interview marketplace. To model this…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
I settle the computational complexity of student-project-resource matching-allocation problems, in which students and resources are assigned to projects \citep{pc2017}. A project's capacity for students is endogenously determined by the…
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n…
Following up on purely theoretical work of Bredereck et al. [AAAI 2020], we contribute further theoretical insights into adapting stable two-sided matchings to change. Moreover, we perform extensive empirical studies hinting at numerous…
We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists are of bounded length. The first variant, EGAL d-SRI,…
Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…
We consider the problem of constructing matched groups such that the resulting groups are statistically similar with respect to their average values for multiple covariates. This group-matching problem arises in many cases, including…