Related papers: Location-Restricted Stable Matching
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
We study the stable marriage problem in the partial information setting where the agents, although they have an underlying true strict linear order, are allowed to specify partial orders. Specifically, we focus on the case where the agents…
Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of maximum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this…
The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is characterized by the preferences of agents over other agents as roommates: each agent ranks all others in strict order of preference. A solution to SR is then a partition of the agents into pairs so that…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison, fairness in settings with preferences on both sides, that is,…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
The Hospital Residents problem with sizes (HRS) is a generalization of the well-studied hospital residents (HR) problem. In the HRS problem, an agent $a$ has a size $s(a)$ and the agent occupies $s(a)$ many positions of the hospital $h$…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
The Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S) comprises three sets of agents, namely students, projects and lecturers, where students have preferences over projects and lecturers have preferences…
The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, especially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large number of…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over pairs of (typically geographically close) hospitals. It is…
We consider the problem of stable matching with dynamic preference lists. At each time step, the preference list of some player may change by swapping random adjacent members. The goal of a central agency (algorithm) is to maintain an…