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We study the optimal joint intervention of a planner who can influence both the standalone marginal utilities of agents in a network and the weights of the links connecting them. The welfare-maximizing intervention displays two key…

Conditional risk minimization arises in high-stakes decisions where risk must be assessed in light of side information, such as stressed economic conditions, specific customer profiles, or other contextual covariates. Constructing reliable…

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how some fixed value should be shared among them. We are interested in settings where the share that each agent receives is based on how that agent is evaluated by other members of…

Subsidies are commonly used to encourage behaviors that can lead to short- or long-term benefits. Typical examples include subsidized job training programs and provisions of preventive health products, in which both behavioral responses and…

Hybrid work policy, especially return-to-office requirements, remains a globally salient topic as workers, companies, and governments continue to debate and disagree. Despite extensive discussions on the benefits and drawbacks of remote and…

This paper focuses on a decentralized profit-center firm that uses negotiated transfer pricing as an instrument to coordinate the production process. Moreover, the firm's headquarters gives its divisions full authority over operating…

We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We…

This paper investigates the optimal management of an aggregated defined benefit pension plan in a stochastic environment. The interest rate follows the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck model, the benefits follow the geometric Brownian motion while the…

In this work we investigate the inefficiency of the electricity system with strategic agents. Specifically, we prove that without a proper control the total demand of an inefficient system is at most twice the total demand of the optimal…

The implementation of a supervision and incentive process for identical workers may lead to wage variance that stems from employer and employee optimization. The harder it is to assess the nature of the labor output, the more important such…

What type of delegation contract should be offered when facing a risk of the magnitude of the pandemic we are currently experiencing and how does the likelihood of an exogenous early termination of the relationship modify the terms of a…

We study a model of a corporation which has the possibility to choose various production/business policies with different expected profits and risks. In the model there are restrictions on the dividend distribution rates as well as…

We consider a variant of the classical Secretary Problem. In this setting, the candidates are ranked according to some exchangeable random variable and the quest is to maximize the expected quality of the chosen aspirant. We find an upper…

This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for the public to stop the contract. The public ("she") pays a…

We study a single task allocation problem where each worker connects to some other workers to form a network and the task requester only connects to some of the workers. The goal is to design an allocation mechanism such that each worker is…

Multi-agent systems are designed to concurrently accomplish a diverse set of tasks at unprecedented scale. Here, the central problems faced by a system operator are to decide (i) how to divide available resources amongst the agents assigned…

Dynamic contracts with multiple agents is a classical decentralized decision-making problem with asymmetric information. In this paper, we extend the single-agent dynamic incentive contract model in continuous-time to a multi-agent scheme…

The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…

A fund manager invests both the fund's assets and own private wealth in separate but potentially correlated risky assets, aiming to maximize expected utility from private wealth in the long run. If relative risk aversion and investment…

We study an optimal claim reporting problem in a bonus-malus setting. We assume, that the insurance contract consists of two regimes, where reporting a claim leads to a transition to a higher-premium regime, whereas remaining claim-free for…