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Network-based complex systems are inherently interconnected, with the design and performance of subnetworks being interdependent. However, the decisions of self-interested operators may lead to suboptimal outcomes for users. In this paper,…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We investigate whether fairness is compatible with efficiency in economies with multi-self agents, who may not be able to integrate their multiple objectives into a single complete and transitive ranking. We adapt envy-freeness,…
We study a setting in which a principal selects an agent to execute a collection of tasks according to a specified priority sequence. Agents, however, have their own individual priority sequences according to which they wish to execute the…
In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal contracts should satisfy some equilibrium conditions and we…
General partners (GP) are sometimes paid on a deal-by-deal basis and other times on a whole-portfolio basis. When is one method of payment better than the other? I show that when assets (projects or firms) are highly correlated or when GPs…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
A main issue in improving public sector efficiency is to understand to what extent public appointments are based on worker capability, instead of being used to reward political supporters (patronage). I contribute to a recent literature…
Motivated by equilibrium models of labor markets, we develop a formulation of causal strategic classification in which strategic agents can directly manipulate their outcomes. As an application, we compare employers that anticipate the…
The application of incentives, such as reward and punishment, is a frequently applied way for promoting cooperation among interacting individuals in structured populations. However, how to properly use the incentives is still a challenging…
The emergence of new organizational forms--such as virtual teams--has brought forward some challenges for teams. One of the most relevant challenges is coordinating the decisions of team members who work from different time zones. Intuition…
We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…
We propose a multi-agent model of an asset market and study conditions that guarantee that the strategy of an individual agent cannot outperform the market. The model assumes a mean-field approximation of the market by considering an…
In this paper, a novel distributed optimization framework has been proposed. The key idea is to convert optimization problems into optimal control problems where the objective of each agent is to design the current control input minimizing…
We investigate how reinforcement learning agents can learn to cooperate. Drawing inspiration from human societies, in which successful coordination of many individuals is often facilitated by hierarchical organisation, we introduce Feudal…
This paper investigates the problem of coordinating several agents through their actions. Although the methodology applies to general scenarios, the present work focuses on a situation with an asymmetric observation structure that only…
This paper studies the mathematical problem of allocating payouts (compensations) in an endowment contingency fund using a risk-sharing rule that satisfies full allocation. Besides the participants, an administrator manages the fund by…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
In this paper, we consider the problem of a Principal aiming at designing a reward function for a population of heterogeneous agents. We construct an incentive based on the ranking of the agents, so that a competition among the latter is…
We study an optimal wage band problem in a competitive matching labor market where education signals worker ability. We prove uniqueness of the competitive signaling equilibrium under a general class of utility and profit functions and show…