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There is increasing interest in allocating treatments based on observed individual characteristics: examples include targeted marketing, individualized credit offers, and heterogeneous pricing. Treatment personalization introduces…

We consider a coalitional game with the same payoff for all players. To maximize the payoff, the players need to use one collective strategy, if all players are in certain states, and the other strategy otherwise. The current state of each…

In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the information they receive. We study this problem within the…

In the context of scientific policy and science management, this study examines the system of nonuniform wage distribution for researchers. A nonlinear mathematical model of optimal remuneration for scientific workers has been developed,…

Linear contracts are ubiquitous in practice, yet optimal contract theory often prescribes complex, nonlinear structures. We provide a distributional robustness justification for linear contracts. We study a principal-agent problem where the…

We study the role of regulatory inspections in a contract design problem in which a principal interacts separately with multiple agents. Each agent's hidden action includes a dimension that determines whether they undertake an extra costly…

A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…

We analyze the causal impact of positive and negative feedback on professional performance. We exploit a unique data source in which quasi-random, naturally occurring variations within subjective ratings serve as positive and negative…

We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward function. While prior work largely focuses on unconstrained…

Research on promoting cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents has often focused on the bi-objective optimisation problem: minimising the total incentive cost while maximising the frequency of cooperation. However, the optimal…

We introduce a novel model of contracts with combinatorial actions that accounts for sequential and adaptive agent behavior. As in the standard model, a principal delegates the execution of a costly project to an agent. There are $n$…

We consider the optimal reinsurance problem from the point of view of a direct insurer owning several dependent risks, assuming a maximal expected utility criterion and independent negotiation of reinsurance for each risk. Without any…

A new class of multi agent single machine scheduling problems is introduced, where each job is associated with a self interested agent with a utility function decreasing in completion time. We aim to achieve a fair solution by maximizing…

A large fraction of total healthcare expenditure occurs due to end-of-life (EOL) care, which means it is important to study the problem of more carefully incentivizing necessary versus unnecessary EOL care because this has the potential to…

We examine the trade-off between the provision of incentives to exert costly effort (ex-ante moral hazard) and the incentives needed to prevent the agent from manipulating the profit observed by the principal (ex-post moral hazard).…

We study a model of moral hazard with heterogeneous beliefs where each of agent's actions gives rise to a pair of probability distributions over output levels, one representing the beliefs of the agent and the other those of the principal.…

In this paper, we investigate the Merton portfolio management problem in the context of non-exponential discounting. This gives rise to time-inconsistency of the decision-maker. If the decision-maker at time t=0 can commit his/her…

I study how organizations assign tasks to identify the best candidate to promote among a pool of workers. Task allocation and workers' motivation interact through the organization's promotion decisions. The organization designs the workers'…

We consider a variant of the secretary problem in which the candidates state their expected salary at the interview, which we assume is in accordance with their qualifications. The goal is for the employer to hire the best or the worst…

To promote cooperation in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning, the reward signals of all agents can be aggregated together, forming global rewards that are commonly known as the fully cooperative setting. However, global rewards are usually…