Related papers: Verifying Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Probabilist…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…
Creating strong agents for games with more than two players is a major open problem in AI. Common approaches are based on approximating game-theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, which have strong theoretical guarantees in…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
We suggest a novel stochastic-approximation algorithm to compute a symmetric Nash-equilibrium strategy in a general queueing game with a finite action space. The algorithm involves a single simulation of the queueing process with dynamic…
While fictitious play is guaranteed to converge to Nash equilibrium in certain game classes, such as two-player zero-sum games, it is not guaranteed to converge in non-zero-sum and multiplayer games. We show that fictitious play in fact…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Two-player complete-information game trees are perhaps the simplest possible setting for studying general-sum games and the computational problem of finding equilibria. These games admit a simple bottom-up algorithm for finding subgame…
The works of (Daskalakis et al., 2009, 2022; Jin et al., 2022; Deng et al., 2023) indicate that computing Nash equilibria in multi-player Markov games is a computationally hard task. This fact raises the question of whether or not…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-based stochastic multiplayer games with omega-regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval…
This paper introduces a new solution concept for non-cooperative games in normal form with no ties and pure strategies: the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium. The players are rational in all possible worlds and know each other's strategies…
We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal and without the capability of correlating their strategies in strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept can…
We provide the first fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing an approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in tree-structured graphical multi-hypermatrix games (GMhGs). GMhGs are generalizations of normal-form…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
This paper is about computing constrained approximate Nash equilibria in polymatrix games, which are succinctly represented many-player games defined by an interaction graph between the players. In a recent breakthrough, Rubinstein showed…
Dynamic games provide a fundamental framework for multi-agent decision-making over time, yet computing feedback Nash equilibria (FNEs) in infinite-horizon discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) settings remains computationally challenging.…
This paper studies the equilibrium properties of the ``obvious strategy profile'' in large finite-player games. Each player in such a strategy profile simply adopts a randomized strategy as she would have used in a symmetric equilibrium of…
We develop a probabilistic approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games. Based on an alternative description of continuous-time Markov chain by means of semimartingale and the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control, our…