Related papers: Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
We show that every two-player stochastic game with finite state and action sets and bounded, Borel-measurable, and shift-invariant payoffs, admits an $\ep$-equilibrium for all $\varepsilon>0$.
We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs,…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
Within the framework of Game Theory, contests study decision-making in those situations or conflicts when rewards depend on the relative rank between contenders rather than their absolute performance. By relying on the formalism of Tullock…
We consider the problem of budget allocation for competitive influence maximization over social networks. In this problem, multiple competing parties (players) want to distribute their limited advertising resources over a set of social…
We consider two-player games played on finite graphs equipped with costs on edges and introduce two winning conditions, cost-parity and cost-Streett, which require bounds on the cost between requests and their responses. Both conditions…
In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…
We consider zero-sum stochastic games with perfect information and finitely many states and actions. The payoff is computed by a function which associates to each infinite sequence of states and actions a real number. We prove that if the…
We examine two-sided markets where players arrive stochastically over time and are drawn from a continuum of types. The cost of matching a client and provider varies, so a social planner is faced with two contending objectives: a) to reduce…
We identify a subtle security issue that impacts mechanism design in scenarios in which agents can absolutely commit to strategies. Absolute commitments allow the strategy of an agent to depend on the commitments made by the other agents.…
In this paper we study the nonzero-sum Dynkin game in continuous time which is a two player non-cooperative game on stopping times. We show that it has a Nash equilibrium point for general stochastic processes. As an application, we…
We study the Proportional Response dynamic in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, the players bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets…
In this discussion draft, we explore heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players with quadratic costs, where the market is supposed to have the isoelastic demand. For each of the models considered in this draft, we analytically…
This paper analyses how risk-taking behaviour and preferences over consumption rank can emerge as a neutrally stable equilibrium when individuals face an anti-coordination task. If in an otherwise homogeneous society information about…
A variety of social, economic, and political interactions have long been modelled after Blotto games. In this paper, we introduce a general model of dynamic $n$-player Blotto contests. The players have asymmetric resources, and the…
The volunteer's dilemma is a well-known game in game theory that models the conflict players face when deciding whether to volunteer for a collective benefit, knowing that volunteering incurs a personal cost. In this work, we introduce a…
A basic question for zero-sum repeated games consists in determining whether the mean payoff per time unit is independent of the initial state. In the special case of "zero-player" games, i.e., of Markov chains equipped with additive…
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…
We introduce a new non-zero-sum game of optimal stopping with asymmetric exercise opportunities. Given a stochastic process modelling the value of an asset, one player observes and can act on the process continuously, while the other player…