Related papers: Commitment, Conflict, and Status Quo in Bargaining

In security games, the solution concept commonly used is that of a Stackelberg equilibrium where the defender gets to commit to a mixed strategy. The motivation for this is that the attacker can repeatedly observe the defender's actions and…

We consider a committee voting on whether to adopt a reform under a quota rule, where members differ in how much they value the reform some supporting it, others opposing it. We examine how members can influence each other's votes through…

Originating in evolutionary game theory, the class of "zero-determinant" strategies enables a player to unilaterally enforce linear payoff relationships in simple repeated games. An upshot of this kind of payoff constraint is that it can…

We present a new tool for the study of multiplayer stochastic games, namely the modified game, which is a normal-form game that depends on the discount factor, the initial state, and for every player a partition of the set of states and a…

We consider a nonlinear pricing environment with private information. We provide profit guarantees (and associated mechanisms) that the seller can achieve across all possible distributions of willingness to pay of the buyers. With a…

A principal and an agent divide a surplus. Only the agent knows the surplus' true size and decides how much of it to reveal initially. Both parties can exert costly effort to conclusively prove the surplus' true size. The agent's liability…

An unknown positive number of items arrive at independent uniformly distributed times in the interval [0,1] to a selector, whose task is to pick online the last one. We show that under the assumption of an adversary determining the number…

This paper studies bargaining when buyers can continue searching for alternative sellers while negotiating, which limits their commitment to complete a transaction. Using transaction level data from a Japanese online marketplace, I document…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

This paper formally models the strategic repeated interactions between a system, comprising of a machine learning (ML) model and associated explanation method, and an end-user who is seeking a prediction/label and its explanation for a…

This paper considers the portfolio management problem of optimal investment, consumption and life insurance. We are concerned with time inconsistency of optimal strategies. Natural assumptions, like different discount rates for consumption…

Mean-payoff games are important quantitative models for open reactive systems. They have been widely studied as games of full observation. In this paper we investigate the algorithmic properties of several sub-classes of mean-payoff games…

In this paper we study stochastic dynamic games with many players; these are a fundamental model for a wide range of economic applications. The standard solution concept for such games is Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), but it is well…

We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…

Situations where people have to decide between hurting themselves or another person are at the core of many individual and global conflicts. Yet little is known about how people behave when facing these situations in the lab. Here we report…

Consider a very simple class of (finite) games: after an initial move by nature, each player makes one move. Moreover, the players have common interests: at each node, all the players get the same payoff. We show that the problem of…

We analyze a two-player, nonzero-sum Dynkin game of stopping with incomplete information. We assume that each player observes his own Brownian motion, which is not only independent of the other player's Brownian motion but also not…

This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…

We study a non-cooperative two-sided facility location game in which facilities and clients behave strategically. This is in contrast to many other facility location games in which clients simply visit their closest facility. Facility…

All-pay auctions, a common mechanism for various human and agent interactions, suffers, like many other mechanisms, from the possibility of players' failure to participate in the auction. We model such failures, and fully characterize…