Related papers: Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Norma…

We develop an algorithmic framework for solving convex optimization problems using no-regret game dynamics. By converting the problem of minimizing a convex function into an auxiliary problem of solving a min-max game in a sequential…

We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$). Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate…

We introduce Cautious Optimism, a framework for substantially faster regularized learning in general games. Cautious Optimism, as a variant of Optimism, adaptively controls the learning pace in a dynamic, non-monotone manner to accelerate…

This paper studies a variant of two-player zero-sum matrix games, where, at each timestep, the row player selects row $i$, the column player selects column $j$, and the row player receives a noisy reward with expected value $A_{i,j}$, along…

We study online learning in two-player uninformed Markov games, where the opponent's actions and policies are unobserved. In this setting, Tian et al. (2021) show that achieving no-external-regret is impossible without incurring an…

We consider the setting of iterative learning control, or model-based policy learning in the presence of uncertain, time-varying dynamics. In this setting, we propose a new performance metric, planning regret, which replaces the standard…

Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…

Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. Recent…

Regret minimization is a powerful method for finding Nash equilibria in Normal-Form Games (NFGs) and Extensive-Form Games (EFGs), but it typically guarantees convergence only for the average strategy. However, computing the average strategy…

In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably…

We argue that the existing regret matchings for Nash equilibrium approximation conduct "jumpy" strategy updating when the probabilities of future plays are set to be proportional to positive regret measures. We propose a geometrical regret…

Focusing on the expert problem in online learning, this paper studies the interpolation of several performance metrics via $\phi$-regret minimization, which measures the total loss of an algorithm by its regret with respect to an arbitrary…

We show that, for any sufficiently small fixed $\epsilon > 0$, when both players in a general-sum two-player (bimatrix) game employ optimistic mirror descent (OMD) with smooth regularization, learning rate $\eta = O(\epsilon^2)$ and $T =…

We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of…

We study the problem of making predictions so that downstream agents who best respond to them will be guaranteed diminishing swap regret, no matter what their utility functions are. It has been known since Foster and Vohra (1997) that…

Partial-monitoring games constitute a mathematical framework for sequential decision making problems with imperfect feedback: The learner repeatedly chooses an action, opponent responds with an outcome, and then the learner suffers a loss…

We introduce DREAM, a deep reinforcement learning algorithm that finds optimal strategies in imperfect-information games with multiple agents. Formally, DREAM converges to a Nash Equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games and to an…

This paper investigates the sublinear regret guarantees of two non-no-regret algorithms in zero-sum games: Fictitious Play, and Online Gradient Descent with constant stepsizes. In general adversarial online learning settings, both…

An individual can only experience regret if she learns about an unchosen alternative. In many situations, learning about an unchosen alternative is possible only if someone else chose it. We develop a model where the ex-post information…

We consider model selection in stochastic bandit and reinforcement learning problems. Given a set of base learning algorithms, an effective model selection strategy adapts to the best learning algorithm in an online fashion. We show that by…