Related papers: Participation Incentives in Online Cooperative Gam…
In the future, artificial learning agents are likely to become increasingly widespread in our society. They will interact with both other learning agents and humans in a variety of complex settings including social dilemmas. We argue that…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
We study the design of optimal incentives in sequential processes. To do so, we consider a basic and fundamental model in which an agent initiates a value-creating sequential process through costly investment with random success. If…
We propose a novel decision making framework for forming potential collaboration among otherwise competing agents in subsurface systems. The agents can be, e.g., groundwater, CO$_2$, or hydrogen injectors and extractors with conflicting…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
We investigate the manipulation of power indices in TU-cooperative games by stimulating (subject to a budget constraint) changes in the propensity of other players to participate to the game. We display several algorithms that show that the…
Direct reciprocity and conditional cooperation are important mechanisms to prevent free riding in social dilemmas. But in large groups these mechanisms may become ineffective, because they require single individuals to have a substantial…
We revisit the coalition structure generation problem in which the goal is to partition the players into exhaustive and disjoint coalitions so as to maximize the social welfare. One of our key results is a general polynomial-time algorithm…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
Strategic interactions between competitive entities are generally considered from the perspective of complete revelation of benefits achieved from those interactions, in the form of public payoff functions and/or beliefs, in the announced…
We study coalition formation in the framework of fractional hedonic games (FHGs). The objective is to maximize social welfare in an online model where agents arrive one by one and must be assigned to coalitions immediately and irrevocably.…
Measuring individual productivity (or equivalently distributing the overall productivity) in a network structure of workers displaying peer effects has been a subject of ongoing interest in many areas ranging from academia to industry. In…
An important task in the analysis of multiagent systems is to understand how groups of selfish players can form coalitions, i.e., work together in teams. In this paper, we study the dynamics of coalition formation under bounded rationality.…
Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…
We introduce and study a model of an interacting population of agents who collaborate in groups which compete for limited resources. Groups are formed by random matching agents and their worth is determined by the sum of the efforts…
Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from…
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a…