Related papers: Pareto-undominated strategy-proof rules in economi…

We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…

We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…

In priority-based matching, serial dictatorship (SD) is simple, strategyproof, and Pareto efficient, but not free of justified envy (i.e. fair). This paper studies how to fairly order agents in SD as a function of their priorities. I show…

An inconsistent knowledge base can be abstracted as a set of arguments and a defeat relation among them. There can be more than one consistent way to evaluate such an argumentation graph. Collective argument evaluation is the problem of…

Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.

It is often argued that an agent making decisions on behalf of two or more principals who have different utility functions should adopt a {\em Pareto-optimal} policy, i.e., a policy that cannot be improved upon for one agent without making…

We introduce the notion of a multidimensional hybrid preference domain on a (finite) set of alternatives that is a Cartesian product of finitely many components. We demonstrate that in a model of public goods provision, multidimensional…

We study a problem of optimal allocation in a discrete-time multi-period pure-exchange economy, where agents have preferences over stochastic endowment processes that are represented by strongly time-consistent dynamic risk measures. We…

We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple assignment. Every individually strategy-proof and Pareto…

We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…

We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among strategic agents. We focus on settings wherein monetary transfers are not available and each agent's private valuation is a submodular function with binary marginals, i.e., the…

We consider the mechanism design problem of a principal allocating a single good to one of several agents without monetary transfers. Each agent desires the good and uses it to create value for the principal. We designate this value as the…

When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…

Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other and let g have range S on NP. We complete the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S contains more than two elements, then g…

We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…

We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to…

A strictly strategy-proof mechanism is one that asks agents to use strictly dominant strategies. In the canonical one-dimensional mechanism design setting with private values, we show that strict strategy-proofness is equivalent to strict…

Reallocating resources to get mutually beneficial outcomes is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings. While finding an arbitrary Pareto optimal allocation is generally easy, checking whether a particular allocation is Pareto…

We study the problem of assigning indivisible objects to agents where each is to receive at most one. To ensure fairness in the absence of monetary compensation, we consider random assignments. Random Priority, also known as Random Serial…

In the object reallocation problem, achieving Pareto-efficiency is desirable, but may be too demanding for implementation purposes. In contrast, pair-efficiency, which is the minimal efficiency requirement, is more suitable. Despite being a…