Related papers: Integrating Sequential Hypothesis Testing into Adv…

Strategic deception is an act of manipulating the opponent's perception to gain strategic advantages. In this paper, we study synthesis of deceptive winning strategies in two-player turn-based zero-sum reachability games on graphs with…

In this paper, we study the use of deception for strategic planning in adversarial environments. We model the interaction between the agent (player 1) and the adversary (player 2) as a two-player concurrent game in which the adversary has…

Defensive deception techniques have emerged as a promising proactive defense mechanism to mislead an attacker and thereby achieve attack failure. However, most game-theoretic defensive deception approaches have assumed that players maintain…

Ensuring that AI systems make strategic decisions aligned with the specified preferences in adversarial sequential interactions is a critical challenge for developing trustworthy AI systems, especially when the environment is stochastic and…

As artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities advance rapidly, frontier models increasingly demonstrate systematic deception and scheming, complying with safety protocols during oversight but defecting when unsupervised. This paper examines…

Progressively intricate cyber infiltration mechanisms have made conventional means of defense, such as firewalls and malware detectors, incompetent. These sophisticated infiltration mechanisms can study the defender's behavior, identify…

In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…

Quantumgametheoryextendsclassical strategic decision-making by incorporating quantum superposition, entanglement, and measurement-induced randomness into competitive interactions. This paper introduces a team-based Quantum Sabotage Game…

This paper investigates the application of game-theoretic principles combined with advanced Kalman filtering techniques to enhance maritime target tracking systems. Specifically, the paper presents a two-player, imperfect information,…

We study the adversarial binary hypothesis testing problem in the sequential setting. Associated with each hypothesis is a closed, convex set of distributions. Given the hypothesis, each observation is generated according to a distribution…

We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…

Deception is a technique to mislead human or computer systems by manipulating beliefs and information. For the applications of cyber deception, non-cooperative games become a natural choice of models to capture the adversarial interactions…

We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, the problem turns out to…

In shared autonomy, a critical tension arises when an automated assistant must choose between obeying a human's instruction and deliberately overriding it to prevent harm. This safety-critical behavior is known as intelligent disobedience.…

Adversarial decision making is a particular type of decision making problem where the gain a decision maker obtains as a result of his decisions is affected by the actions taken by others. Representation of alternatives' evaluations and…

We present a robust framework with computational algorithms to support decision makers in sequential games. Our framework includes methods to solve games with complete information, assess the robustness of such solutions and, finally,…

We introduce the framework of LLM-Stackelberg games, a class of sequential decision-making models that integrate large language models (LLMs) into strategic interactions between a leader and a follower. Departing from classical Stackelberg…

This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game. This "iterated semi network-form game" framework has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic players…

Statistical Hypothesis Testing (SHT) is a class of inference methods whereby one makes use of empirical data to test a hypothesis and often emit a judgment about whether to reject it or not. In this paper we focus on the logical aspect of…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…