Related papers: Rational Capability in Concurrent Games
The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…
Various extensions of the temporal logic ATL have recently been introduced to express rich properties of multi-agent systems. Among these, ATLsc extends ATL with strategy contexts, while Strategy Logic has first-order quantification over…
Game Logic is an excellent setting to study proofs-about-programs via the interpretation of those proofs as programs, because constructive proofs for games correspond to effective winning strategies to follow in response to the opponent's…
This work discusses how to build more rational language and multimodal agents and what criteria define rationality in intelligent systems. Rationality is the quality of being guided by reason, characterized by decision-making that aligns…
In multi-agent system design, a crucial aspect is to ensure robustness, meaning that for a coalition of agents A, small violations of adversarial assumptions only lead to small violations of A's goals. In this paper we introduce a logical…
In this paper, we introduce game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for Qualitative Choice Logic (QCL), which, in order to express preferences, extends classical propositional logic with an additional connective called ordered disjunction. Firstly,…
In the same sense as classical logic is a formal theory of truth, the recently initiated approach called computability logic is a formal theory of computability. It understands (interactive) computational problems as games played by a…
We define a game on distributed Petri nets, where several players interact with each other, and with an environment. The players, or users, have perfect knowledge of the current state, and pursue a common goal. Such goal is expressed by…
Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL$^*$) is a well-established framework for formal reasoning about multi-agent systems. However, while ATL$^*$ can reason about the strategic ability of agents (e.g., some coalition $A$ can ensure that a…
We develop a general game-theoretic framework for reasoning about strategic agents performing possibly costly computation. In this framework, many traditional game-theoretic results (such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium) no longer…
Coalitional games are mathematical models suited to analyze scenarios where players can collaborate by forming coalitions in order to obtain higher worths than by acting in isolation. A fundamental problem for coalitional games is to single…
We propose a variant of Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) grounded in the agents' operational know-how, as defined by their libraries of abstract plans. Inspired by ATLES, a variant itself of ATL, it is possible in our logic to…
Remarkable performance of large language models (LLMs) in a variety of tasks brings forth many opportunities as well as challenges of utilizing them in production settings. Towards practical adoption of LLMs, multi-agent systems hold great…
We develop game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for the fragment ATL+ of the full Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL*, essentially extending a recently introduced GTS for ATL. We first show that the new game-theoretic semantics is equivalent to…
Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a…
In this paper we introduce Epistemic Strategy Logic (ESL), an extension of Strategy Logic with modal operators for individual knowledge. This enhanced framework allows us to represent explicitly and to reason about the knowledge agents have…
As large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), we explore whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic…
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed as autonomous agents on behalf of institutions and individuals in economic, political, and social settings that involve negotiation. Yet this trend carries significant risks if…
Coalition Logic is a central logic in logical research on strategic reasoning. In a recent paper, Li and Ju argued that generally, models of Coalition Logic, concurrent game models, have three too strong assumptions: seriality, independence…
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that…