Related papers: Rational Capability in Concurrent Games
We propose a nonmonotonic Description Logic of typicality able to account for the phenomenon of concept combination of prototypical concepts. The proposed logic relies on the logic of typicality ALC TR, whose semantics is based on the…
We present a causality-based algorithm for solving two-player reachability games represented by logical constraints. These games are a useful formalism to model a wide array of problems arising, e.g., in program synthesis. Our technique for…
Game semantics and winning strategies offer a potential conceptual bridge between semantics and proof systems of logics. We illustrate this link for hybrid logic -- an extension of modal logic that allows for explicit reference to worlds…
Game semantics is a trace-like denotational semantics for programming languages where the notion of legal observable behaviour of a term is defined combinatorially, by means of rules of a game between the term (the "Proponent") and its…
Ability to count number of occurrences of events within a specified time interval is very useful in specification of resource bounded real time computation. In this paper, we study an extension of Metric Temporal Logic ($\mathsf{MTL}$) with…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
We introduce First-Order Coalition Logic ($\mathsf{FOCL}$), which combines key intuitions behind Coalition Logic ($\mathsf{CL}$) and Strategy Logic ($\mathsf{SL}$). Specifically, $\mathsf{FOCL}$ allows for arbitrary quantification over…
Large language models (LLMs), a recent advance in deep learning and machine intelligence, have manifested astonishing capacities, now considered among the most promising for artificial general intelligence. With human-like capabilities,…
The game theoretic concepts of rationalizability and iterated dominance are closely related and provide characterizations of each other. Indeed, the equivalence between them implies that in a two player finite game, the remaining set of…
Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning…
Relational reasoning is the ability to infer relations that jointly bind multiple entities, attributes, or variables. This ability is central to scientific reasoning, but existing evaluations of relational reasoning in large language models…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
Large language models (LLMs) have shown success in handling simple games with imperfect information and enabling multi-agent coordination, but their ability to facilitate practical collaboration against other agents in complex, imperfect…
In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…
We present a variant of ATL with distributed knowledge operators based on a synchronous and perfect recall semantics. The coalition modalities in this logic are based on partial observation of the full history, and incorporate a form of…
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the…
Differences in perception, information asymmetries, and bounded rationality lead game-theoretic players to derive a private, subjective view of the game that may diverge from the underlying ground-truth scenario and may be misaligned with…
The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…
We introduce language-based games, a generalization of psychological games [6] that can also capture reference-dependent preferences [7]. The idea is to extend the domain of the utility function to situations, maximal consistent sets in…