Related papers: Multi-agent coordination via communication partiti…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…
In this paper, continuous-time noncooperative games in networks of double-integrator agents are explored. The existing methods require that agents communicate with their neighbors in real time. In this paper, we propose two discrete-time…
We address the multi-agent motion planning problem where interactions, collisions, and congestion co-exist. Conventional game-theoretic planners capture interactions among agents but often converge to conservative, congested equilibria.…
In this work we study a multi-agent coordination problem in which agents are only able to communicate with each other intermittently through a cloud server. To reduce the amount of required communication, we develop a self-triggered…
In this work we study of competitive situations among users of a set of global resources. More precisely we study the effect of cost policies used by these resources in the convergence time to a pure Nash equilibrium. The work is divided in…
We present a new type of coordination mechanism among multiple agents for the allocation of a finite resource, such as the allocation of time slots for passing an intersection. We consider the setting where we associate one counter to each…
We present new coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs on $m$ unrelated machines. A coordination mechanism aims to mitigate the impact of selfishness of jobs on the efficiency of schedules by defining a local scheduling policy…
In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…
In classical job-scheduling games, each job behaves as a selfish player, choosing a machine to minimize its own completion time. To reduce the equilibria inefficiency, coordination mechanisms are employed, allowing each machine to follow…
We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
Suppose that a set of $m$ tasks are to be shared as equally as possible amongst a set of $n$ resources. A game-theoretic mechanism to find a suitable allocation is to associate each task with a ``selfish agent'', and require each agent to…
This paper provides a novel solution to a task allocation problem, by which a group of agents decides on the assignment of a discrete set of tasks in a distributed manner. In this setting, heterogeneous agents have individual preferences…
Nash equilibrium is a key concept in game theory fundamental for elucidating the equilibrium state of strategic interactions, finding applications in diverse fields such as economics, political science, and biology. However, the Nash…
When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…
Developing autonomous agents that can strategize and cooperate with humans under information asymmetry is challenging without effective communication in natural language. We introduce a shared-control game, where two players collectively…
In this paper, we investigate the dynamics of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents in a coevolutionary model for actions and opinions. In the model, the individuals of a population interact on a two-layer network, sharing their…
Collaboration is an integral part of human dialogue. Typical task-oriented dialogue games assign asymmetric roles to the participants, which limits their ability to elicit naturalistic role-taking in collaboration and its negotiation. We…
We address a noncooperative game problem in multi-controller system under delayed and asymmetric information structure. Under these conditions, the classical separation principle fails as estimation and control design become strongly…
The central result of this paper is the analysis of an optimization problem which allows one to assess the limiting performance of a team of two agents who coordinate their actions. One agent is fully informed about the past and future…