Related papers: Monotonicity and Bracketing in Games
We introduce set packing games as an abstraction of situations in which $n$ selfish players select subsets of a finite set of indivisible items, and analyze the quality of several equilibria for this class of games. Assuming that players…
For any two-by-two game $\G$, we define a new two-player game $\G^Q$. The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game $\G$ communicating via quantum technology according to a certain standard protocol originally introduced by…
Considering infinite-horizon, discrete-time, linear quadratic, N-player dynamic games with scalar dynamics, a graphical representation of feedback Nash equilibrium solutions is provided. This representation is utilised to derive conditions…
We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…
Computational aspects of solution notions such as Nash equilibrium have been extensively studied, including settings where the ultimate goal is to find an equilibrium that possesses some additional properties. Furthermore, in order to…
This paper studies the monotonicity of equilibrium costs and equilibrium loads in nonatomic congestion games, in response to variations of the demands. The main goal is to identify conditions under which a paradoxical non-monotone behavior…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
It is frequently suggested that predictions made by game theory could be improved by considering computational restrictions when modeling agents. Under the supposition that players in a game may desire to balance maximization of payoff with…
A recent body of experimental literature has studied empirical game-theoretical analysis, in which we have partial knowledge of a game, consisting of observations of a subset of the pure-strategy profiles and their associated payoffs to…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…
We investigate a model for representing large multiplayer games, which satisfy strong symmetry properties. This model is made of multiple copies of an arena; each player plays in his own arena, and can partially observe what the other…
We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…
We investigate the existence of certain types of equilibria (Nash, $\varepsilon$-Nash, subgame perfect, $\varepsilon$-subgame perfect, Pareto-optimal) in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games. We use two fundamental…
We investigate the degree of discontinuity of several solution concepts from non-cooperative game theory. While the consideration of Nash equilibria forms the core of our work, also pure and correlated equilibria are dealt with. Formally,…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…
We study mean field games and corresponding $N$-player games in continuous time over a finite time horizon where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space. As opposed to previous works on finite state mean field games, we…
Learning processes in games explain how players grapple with one another in seeking an equilibrium. We study a natural model of learning based on individual gradients in two-player continuous games. In such games, the arguably natural…
We introduce a new class of population games that we call monotropic; these are games characterized by the presence of a unique globally neutrally stable Nash equilibrium. Monotropic games generalize strictly concave potential games and…