Related papers: Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
A reinforcement learning agent tries to maximize its cumulative payoff by interacting in an unknown environment. It is important for the agent to explore suboptimal actions as well as to pick actions with highest known rewards. Yet, in…
We study candidates' positioning when adjustments are possible in response to new information about voters' preferences. Re-positioning allows candidates to get closer to the median voter but is costly both financially and electorally. We…
Language models can be persuaded to abandon factual knowledge. This vulnerability is central to AI safety, but its internal mechanism remains poorly understood. We uncover a compact causal mechanism for persuasion-induced factual errors. A…
Effective interlocutors account for the uncertain goals, beliefs, and emotions of others. But even the best human conversationalist cannot perfectly anticipate the trajectory of a dialogue. How well can language models represent inherent…
Market efficiency at least requires the absence of weak arbitrage opportunities, but this is not sufficient to establish a situation where the market is sensitive, i.e., where it "fully reflects" or "rapidly adjusts to" some information…
We study a continuous time economy where agents have asymmetric information. The informed agent (``$I$''), at time zero, receives a private signal about the risky assets' terminal payoff $\Psi(X_T)$, while the uninformed agent (``$U$'') has…
It is well known that the minimal superhedging price of a contingent claim is too high for practical use. In a continuous-time model uncertainty framework, we consider a relaxed hedging criterion based on acceptable shortfall risks.…
We consider a market of risky financial assets whose participants are an informed trader, a representative uninformed trader, and noisy liquidity providers. We prove the existence of a market-clearing equilibrium when the insider…
Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be…
Advice-efficient prediction with expert advice (in analogy to label-efficient prediction) is a variant of prediction with expert advice game, where on each round of the game we are allowed to ask for advice of a limited number $M$ out of…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…
Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…
Decisions in organizations are about evaluating alternatives and choosing the one that would best serve organizational goals. To the extent that the evaluation of alternatives could be formulated as a predictive task with appropriate…
We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…
The question of what global information must distributed rational agents a-priori know about the network in order for equilibrium to be possible is researched here. Until now, distributed algorithms with rational agents have assumed that…
In this work we generalize standard Decision Theory by assuming that two outcomes can also be incomparable. Two motivating scenarios show how incomparability may be helpful to represent those situations where, due to lack of information,…
This paper considers an infinitely repeated three-player Bayesian game with lack of information on two sides, in which an informed player plays two zero-sum games simultaneously at each stage against two uninformed players. This is a…
Algorithms are used to aid human decision makers by making predictions and recommending decisions. Currently, these algorithms are trained to optimize prediction accuracy. What if they were optimized to control final decisions? In this…
Information is replicable in that it can be simultaneously consumed and sold to others. We study how resale affects a decentralized market for information. We show that even if the initial seller is an informational monopolist, she captures…
In a game of persuasion with evidence, a sender has private information. By presenting evidence on the information, the sender wishes to persuade a receiver to take a single action (e.g., hire a job candidate, or convict a defendant). The…