Related papers: Renegotiation-Proof Cheap Talk
A principal who values an object allocates it to one or more agents. Agents learn private information (signals) from an information designer about the allocation payoff to the principal. Monetary transfer is not available but the principal…
In the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, when every player has a different discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some threshold. What happens if the players…
Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit pronounced context-dependent variability that undermines predictable multi-agent behavior in tasks requiring strategic thinking. Focusing on models that range from 7 to 9 billion parameters in size…
In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of…
The issue of fairness in recommendation is becoming increasingly essential as Recommender Systems touch and influence more and more people in their daily lives. In fairness-aware recommendation, most of the existing algorithmic approaches…
Negotiation requires more than inferring what the other side wants: it requires using that information to make advantageous offers and counteroffers over multiple turns. We study whether large language model (LLM) agents do this in a…
Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a…
It is well-known that acting in an individually rational manner, according to the principles of classical game theory, may lead to sub-optimal solutions in a class of problems named social dilemmas. In contrast, humans generally do not have…
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly…
We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…
How can voters induce politicians to put forth more proximate (in terms of preference) as well as credible platforms (in terms of promise fulfillment) under repeated elections? Building on the work of Aragones et al. (2007), I study how…
We study the classic principal-agent model when the signal observed by the principal is chosen by the agent. We fully characterize the optimal information structure from an agent's perspective in a general moral hazard setting with limited…
In many settings, multiple uninformed agents bargain simultaneously with a single informed agent in each of multiple periods. For example, workers and firms negotiate each year over salaries, and the firm has private information about the…
We study the formation of derivative prices in equilibrium between risk-neutral agents with heterogeneous beliefs about the dynamics of the underlying. Under the condition that the derivative cannot be shorted, we prove the existence of a…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
Coordinating the behaviour of self-interested agents in the presence of multiple Nash equilibria is a major research challenge for multi-agent systems. Pre-game communication between all the players can aid coordination in cases where the…
We consider a trader who aims to liquidate a large position in the presence of an arbitrageur who hopes to profit from the trader's activity. The arbitrageur is uncertain about the trader's position and learns from observed price…
Before purchase, a buyer of an experience good learns about the product's fit using various information sources, including some of which the seller may be unaware of. The buyer, however, can conclusively learn the fit only after purchasing…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
I examine how a decision maker can incentivize an expert to reveal novel actions, expanding the set from which he can choose, without making ex-ante commitments regarding as-of-yet unrevealed actions. The outcomes achievable by any…