Related papers: Coordination Mechanisms with Rank-Based Utilities

We consider the problem of optimal charging of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). We treat this problem as a multi-agent game, where vehicles/agents are heterogeneous since they are subject to possibly different constraints. Under the…

This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which…

We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance,…

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…

We consider a game of decentralized timing of jobs to a single server (machine) with a penalty for deviation from a due date, and no delay costs. The jobs' sizes are homogeneous and deterministic. Each job belongs to a single decision…

This work studies Nash equilibria for games where a mixture of coordinating and anti-coordinating agents, with possibly heterogeneous thresholds, coexist and interact through an all-to-all network. Whilst games with only coordinating or…

Uncoordinated individuals in human society pursuing their personally optimal strategies do not always achieve the social optimum, the most beneficial state to the society as a whole. Instead, strategies form Nash equilibria which are often…

We consider a fundamental game theoretic problem concerning selfish users contributing packets to an M/M/1 queue. In this game, each user controls its own input rate so as to optimize a desired tradeoff between throughput and delay. We…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users…

Aligning AI systems with human values remains a fundamental challenge, but does our inability to create perfectly aligned models preclude obtaining the benefits of alignment? We study a strategic setting where a human user interacts with…

Inspired by the path coordination problem arising from robo-taxis, warehouse management, and mixed-vehicle routing problems, we model a group of heterogeneous players responding to stochastic demands as a congestion game under Markov…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

When two or more self-interested agents put their plans to execution in the same environment, conflicts may arise as a consequence, for instance, of a common utilization of resources. In this case, an agent can postpone the execution of a…

The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where…

Caching networks can reduce the routing costs of accessing contents by caching contents closer to users. However, cache nodes may belong to different entities and behave selfishly to maximize their own benefits, which often lead to…

We propose a model of interdependent scheduling games in which each player controls a set of services that they schedule independently. A player is free to schedule his own services at any time; however, each of these services only begins…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

A new class of multi agent single machine scheduling problems is introduced, where each job is associated with a self interested agent with a utility function decreasing in completion time. We aim to achieve a fair solution by maximizing…