Related papers: Coordination Mechanisms with Rank-Based Utilities
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
In this paper, we study the distributed generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem of non-cooperative games in dynamic environments. Each player in the game aims to minimize its own time-varying cost function subject to a local action…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
Multiplayer games with selfish agents naturally occur in the design of distributed and embedded systems. As the goals of selfish agents are usually neither equivalent nor antagonistic to each other, such games are non zero-sum games. We…
We consider colorful bin packing games in which selfish players control a set of items which are to be packed into a minimum number of unit capacity bins. Each item has one of $m\geq 2$ colors and cannot be packed next to an item of the…
In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to…
Congestion games offer a primary model in the study of pure Nash equilibria in non-cooperative games, and a number of generalized models have been proposed in the literature. One line of generalization includes weighted congestion games, in…
We study rational synthesis problems for concurrent games with omega-regular objectives. Our model of rationality considers only pure strategy Nash equilibria that satisfy either a social welfare or Pareto optimality condition with respect…
This paper addresses a class of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems in coalition games involving both local and coupling constraints for multiple Euler-Lagrange (EL) systems subject to disturbances of unknown bounds. Within each…
This paper studies the existence of pure Nash equilibria in resource graph games, which are a general class of strategic games used to succinctly represent the players' private costs. There is a finite set of resources and the strategy set…
We study the repeated congestion game, in which multiple populations of players share resources, and make, at each iteration, a decentralized decision on which resources to utilize. We investigate the following question: given a model of…
We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…
We consider a network where strategic agents, who are contesting for allocation of resources, are divided into fixed groups. The network control protocol is such that within each group agents get to share the resource and across groups they…
The framework of multi-agent learning explores the dynamics of how individual agent strategies evolve in response to the evolving strategies of other agents. Of particular interest is whether or not agent strategies converge to well known…
Mechanism design is studied for aggregating renewable power producers (RPPs) in a two-settlement power market. Employing an indirect mechanism design framework, a payoff allocation mechanism (PAM) is derived from the competitive equilibrium…
In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the information they receive. We study this problem within the…
We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…
Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal…