Related papers: On the Core of the $b$-Matching Game
The paper defines a non-cooperative simultaneous finite game to study coalition structure formation with intra and inter-coalition externalities. The novelty of the game is that the game definition embeds a \textit{coalition structure…
Baker and Norine introduced a graph-theoretic analogue of the Riemann-Roch theory. A central notion in this theory is the rank of a divisor. In this paper we prove that computing the rank of a divisor on a graph is NP-hard. The…
Capacitated network bargaining games are popular combinatorial games that involve the structure of matchings in graphs. We show that it is always possible to stabilize unit-weight instances of this problem (that is, ensure that they admit a…
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…
We study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We provide the first polynomial time algorithm for computing balanced solutions for…
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…
Coding theory plays a crucial role in enabling reliable communication, storage, and computation. Classical approaches assume a worst-case adversarial model and ensure error correction and data recovery only when the number of honest nodes…
Conventional noncooperative game theory hypothesizes that the joint strategy of a set of players in a game must satisfy an "equilibrium concept". All other joint strategies are considered impossible; the only issue is what equilibrium…
Multi-winner approval voting selects a size-$k$ committee that aggregates voters' approval preferences over a set of alternatives. A central question is coalitional stability: No coalition should be able to pick a committee -- of size at…
Ordered matchings, defined as graphs with linearly ordered vertices, where each vertex is connected to exactly one edge, play a crucial role in the area of ordered graphs and their homomorphisms. Therefore, we consider related problems from…
We consider the fair allocation of indivisible items to several agents and add a graph theoretical perspective to this classical problem. Namely, we introduce an incompatibility relation between pairs of items described in terms of a…
The rapid growth of data-driven technologies and the emergence of various data-sharing paradigms have underscored the need for efficient and stable data exchange protocols. In any such exchange, agents must carefully balance the benefit of…
While discounted payoff games and classic games that reduce to them, like parity and mean-payoff games, are symmetric, their solutions are not. We have taken a fresh view on the properties that optimal solutions need to have, and devised a…
The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an…
Mobile edge computing seeks to provide resources to different delay-sensitive applications. However, allocating the limited edge resources to a number of applications is a challenging problem. To alleviate the resource scarcity problem, we…
We investigate the difficulty of finding economically efficient solutions to coordination problems on graphs. Our work focuses on two forms of coordination problem: pure-coordination games and anti-coordination games. We consider three…
We explore the complexity of nucleolus computation in b-matching games on bipartite graphs. We show that computing the nucleolus of a simple b-matching game is NP-hard even on bipartite graphs of maximum degree 7. We complement this with…
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning…
We consider the problem of fairly allocating indivisible public goods. We model the public goods as elements with feasibility constraints on what subsets of elements can be chosen, and assume that agents have additive utilities across…
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…