Related papers: On the Core of the $b$-Matching Game
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
Combinatorial games lead to several interesting, clean problems in algorithms and complexity theory, many of which remain open. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the area to encourage further research. In particular, we…
We study the complexity of several combinatorial problems in the model of binary networked public goods games. In this game, players are represented by vertices in a network, and the action of each player can be either investing or not…
The introduction of new services, such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC), requires a massive investment that cannot be assumed by a single stakeholder, for instance the Infrastructure Provider (InP). Service Providers (SPs) however also have…
Coding theory plays a crucial role in ensuring data integrity and reliability across various domains, from communication to computation and storage systems. However, its reliance on trust assumptions for data recovery, which requires the…
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to…
Today's multiagent systems have grown too complex to rely on centralized controllers, prompting increasing interest in the design of distributed algorithms. In this respect, game theory has emerged as a valuable tool to complement more…
Traditionally social sciences are interested in structuring people in multiple groups based on their individual preferences. This pa- per suggests an approach to this problem in the framework of a non- cooperative game theory. Definition of…
Motivated by the real-world problem of international kidney exchange (IKEP), recent literature introduced a generalized transferable utility matching game featuring a partition of the vertex set of a graph into players, and analyzed its…
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…
In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the…
Common knowledge is crucial for safe group coordination. In its absence, humans must rely on shared knowledge, which is inherently limited in depth and therefore prone to coordination failures, because any finite-order knowledge attribution…
Boolean games are a succinct representation of strategic games wherein a player seeks to satisfy a formula of propositional logic by selecting a truth assignment to a set of propositional variables under his control. The framework has…
We consider the participatory budgeting problem where each of $n$ voters specifies additive utilities over $m$ candidate projects with given sizes, and the goal is to choose a subset of projects (i.e., a committee) with total size at most…
An energy community is modeled as a cooperative game, where a veto player is needed beyond the prosumers to manage the community, and the worth of a coalition is its benefit compared to the selfish behaviour of the prosumers. Properties of…
As part of an effort to apply the rigorous guarantees of formal verification to multi-agent systems, the field of equilibrium analysis, also called rational verification, studies equilibria in multiplayer games to reason about system-level…
Coded distributed computing (CDC) has emerged as a promising approach because it enables computation tasks to be carried out in a distributed manner while mitigating straggler effects, which often account for the long overall completion…
In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs" as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This…
The computational characterization of game-theoretic solution concepts is a central topic in artificial intelligence, with the aim of developing computationally efficient tools for finding optimal ways to behave in strategic interactions.…
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of…