Related papers: Optimal Utility Design with Arbitrary Information …
We consider black-box global optimization of time-consuming-to-evaluate functions on behalf of a decision-maker (DM) whose preferences must be learned. Each feasible design is associated with a time-consuming-to-evaluate vector of…
We consider the problem of online learning of optimal control for repeatedly operated systems in the presence of parametric uncertainty. During each round of operation, environment selects system parameters according to a fixed but unknown…
We study multi-agent contracts, in which a principal delegates a task to multiple agents and incentivizes them to exert effort. Prior research has mostly focused on maximizing the principal's utility, often resulting in highly disparate…
Using a model in which agents compete to develop a potentially dangerous new technology (AI), we study how changes in the pricing of factors of production (computational resources) affect agents' strategies, particularly their spending on…
The design and optimization of wireless networks have mostly been based on strong mathematical and theoretical modeling. Nonetheless, as novel applications emerge in the era of 5G and beyond, unprecedented levels of complexity will be…
This paper presents a network-based multi-agent optimization model for the strategic planning of service facilities in a stochastic and competitive market. We focus on the type of service facilities that are of intermediate nature, i.e.,…
We develop efficient algorithms to construct utility maximizing mechanisms in the presence of risk averse players (buyers and sellers) in Bayesian settings. We model risk aversion by a concave utility function, and players play…
We study how to optimally design selection mechanisms, accounting for agents' investment incentives. A principal wishes to allocate a resource of homogeneous quality to a heterogeneous population of agents. The principal commits to a…
We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the space of feasible mechanisms with respect to…
User association, the problem of assigning each user device to a suitable base station, is increasingly crucial as wireless networks become denser and serve more users with diverse service demands. The joint optimization of user association…
Network design, a cornerstone of mathematical optimization, is about defining the main characteristics of a network satisfying requirements on connectivity, capacity, and level-of-service. It finds applications in logistics and…
We study social cost losses in Facility Location games, where $n$ selfish agents install facilities over a network and connect to them, so as to forward their local demand (expressed by a non-negative weight per agent). Agents using the…
The problem of controlling multi-agent systems under different models of information sharing among agents has received significant attention in the recent literature. In this paper, we consider a setup where rather than committing to a…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We study the problem of a planner who resolves risk-return trade-offs - like financial investment decisions - on behalf of a collective of agents with heterogeneous risk preferences. The planner's objective is a two-stage utility functional…
In this paper, we investigate the coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned utility functions. Both encoder and decoder are considered as players, that choose the encoding and the decoding in order to maximize their long-run…
Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While…
The emergent behavior of a distributed system is conditioned by the information available to the local decision-makers. Therefore, one may expect that providing decision-makers with more information will improve system performance; in this…
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…
We develop a computationally efficient technique to solve a fairly general distributed service provision problem with selfish users and imperfect information. In particular, in a context in which the service capacity of the existing…