Related papers: Optimal Utility Design with Arbitrary Information …
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
We study optimal monopoly pricing over consumer networks governed by general nonlinear utilities. In our framework, a consumer's utility is jointly determined by an individualized price and the consumption choices of their peers, propagated…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed…
AI agents allow developers to express computational intent abstractly, reducing cognitive effort and helping achieve flow during programming. Increased abstraction, however, comes at a cost: developers cede decision-making authority to…
We study an abstract optimal auction problem for a single good or service. This problem includes environments where agents have budgets, risk preferences, or multi-dimensional preferences over several possible configurations of the good…
This paper studies self-sustained dynamic multiagent systems (MAS) for decentralized resource allocation operating at a competitive equilibrium over a finite horizon. The utility of resource consumption, along with the income from resource…
As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
The control of large-scale, multi-agent systems often entails distributing decision-making across the system components. However, with advances in communication and computation technologies, we can consider new collaborative decision-making…
The best way to design a network is to take into account Availability values and Capacity Planning. You already saw Availability expressed with numbers such as 99.99%. The purpose of this document is to introduce the way to compute…
The main goal of this paper is to design a market operator (MO) and a distribution network operator (DNO) for a network of microgrids in consideration of multiple objectives. This is a high-level design and only those microgrids with…
We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For example, a snow-blower is potentially useful not only to the…
Path selection by selfish agents has traditionally been studied by comparing social optima and equilibria in the Wardrop model, i.e., by investigating the Price of Anarchy in selfish routing. In this work, we refine and extend the…
Networked public goods games model scenarios in which self-interested agents decide whether or how much to invest in an action that benefits not only themselves, but also their network neighbors. Examples include vaccination, security…
This work focuses on the design of taxes in atomic congestion games, a commonly studied model for competitive resource sharing. While most related studies focus on optimizing either the worst- or best-case performance (i.e., Price of…
The increasing vulnerability of electrical distribution systems to extreme weather events and cyber threats necessitates the development of economically viable frameworks for resilience enhancement. While existing approaches focus primarily…
This paper studies the performance of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) when the nodes, that form a Poisson point process, selfishly choose their Medium Access Probability (MAP). We consider goodput and delay as the performance metric that…
Varied real world systems such as transportation networks, supply chains and energy grids present coordination problems where many agents must learn to share resources. It is well known that the independent and selfish interactions of…