Related papers: Optimal Utility Design with Arbitrary Information …
We consider non-cooperative unsplittable congestion games where players share resources, and each player's strategy is pure and consists of a subset of the resources on which it applies a fixed weight. Such games represent unsplittable…
Autonomous agents optimize the reward function we give them. What they don't know is how hard it is for us to design a reward function that actually captures what we want. When designing the reward, we might think of some specific training…
Recently, there has been a growing interest in modeling planning with information constraints. Accordingly, an agent maximizes a regularized expected utility known as the free energy, where the regularizer is given by the information…
We study the extent to which decentralized cost-sharing protocols can achieve good price of anarchy (PoA) bounds in network cost-sharing games with $n$ agents. We focus on the model of resource-aware protocols, where the designer has prior…
The conventional practice of retail electric utilities is to aggregate customers geographically. The utility purchases electricity for its customers via bulk transactions on the wholesale market, and it passes these costs along to its…
In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that…
A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…
In earlier work (Zhang et al., 2016) we used actual traffic data from the Eastern Massachusetts transportation network in the form of spatial average speeds and road segment flow capacities in order to estimate Origin-Destination (OD) flow…
We study the efficiency of non-truthful auctions for auto-bidders with both return on spend (ROS) and budget constraints. The efficiency of a mechanism is measured by the price of anarchy (PoA), which is the worst case ratio between the…
Since its inception, artificial intelligence has relied upon a theoretical foundation centered around perfect rationality as the desired property of intelligent systems. We argue, as others have done, that this foundation is inadequate…
Designing policies for a network of agents is typically done by formulating an optimization problem where each agent has access to state measurements of all the other agents in the network. Such policy designs with centralized information…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
Many smart grid frameworks, such as demand response programs, require accurate information about consumers' parameters (e.g., flexibility) at the aggregator side to optimize grid operations. Existing works typically rely on perfect…
In this paper we study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an arbitrary objective function. We design a mechanism that allows for approximate optimal implementation of insensitive objective functions…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
We investigate the recently proposed label-propagation algorithm (LPA) for identifying network communities. We reformulate the LPA as an equivalent optimization problem, giving an objective function whose maxima correspond to community…
We consider an online version of the well-studied network utility maximization problem, where users arrive one by one and an operator makes irrevocable decisions for each user without knowing the details of future arrivals. We propose a…
We consider an agent interacting with an unknown environment. The environment is a function which maps natural numbers to natural numbers; the agent's set of hypotheses about the environment contains all such functions which are computable…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…