Related papers: Rationalizable Behavior in the Hotelling Model wit…
This paper examines a single-server queueing system that serves both scheduled and strategic walk-in customers. The service discipline follows a first-come, first-served policy, with scheduled customers granted non-preemptive priority. Each…
We consider the simplified model of strategic allocation of trajectories in the airspace presented in a previous publication. Two types of companies, characterized by different cost functions, compete for allocation of trajectories in the…
We study service scheduling problems in a slotted system in which agents arrive with service requests according to a Bernoulli process and have to leave within two slots after arrival, service costs are quadratic in service rates, and there…
Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
This paper investigates a partially observable queueing system with $N$ nodes in which each node has a dedicated arrival stream. There is an extra arrival stream to balance the load of the system by routing its customers to the shortest…
We consider an M/G/1 queue in which the customers, while waiting in line, may renege from it. We study the Nash equilibrium profile among customers, and show that it is defined by two sequences of thresholds. For each customer, the decision…
We model parking in urban centers as a set of parallel queues and overlay a game theoretic structure that allows us to compare the user-selected (Nash) equilibrium to the socially optimal equilibrium. We model arriving drivers as utility…
This work presents a variation of Naor's strategic observable model (1969), by adding a component of customer heterogeneity induced by the location of customers in relation to the server. Accordingly, customers incur a travel cost which…
We consider a polling system with two queues, exhaustive service, no switch-over times and exponential service times. The waiting cost depends on the position of the queue relative to the server: It costs a customer c per time unit to wait…
In this paper, we study a routing and travel-mode choice problem for mobility systems with a multimodal transportation network as a ``mobility game" with coupled action sets. We develop a game-theoretic framework to study the impact on…
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are increasingly applied to complex task allocation in two-sided markets, where agents such as companies and customers interact dynamically. Traditional company-led Stackelberg game models, where companies set…
The standard Hotelling model assumes that the stock of an exhaustible resource is known. We expand on the model by Arrow and Chang that introduced stochastic discoveries and for the first time completely solve such a model using impulse…
We consider an M/M/1 feedback queue in which service attempts may fail, requiring the customer to rejoin the queue. Arriving customers act strategically, deciding whether to join the queue based on a threshold strategy that depends on the…
We study a dispatching and pricing problem in two-sided spatial queues with fixed supply, motivated by ride-hailing and robotaxi platforms. Idle drivers queue on one side, waiting to pick up riders, while riders queue on the other, waiting…
In Naor's model [17], customers decide whether or not to join a queue after observing its length. This work considers a variation in which customers are heterogeneous in their service value (reward) $R$ from completed service and…
Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ride-hailing, we study how strategic servers impact the system performance. We consider a discrete-time process in which, heterogeneous types of customers and servers arrive. Each…
Schelling's segregation model is a landmark model in sociology. It shows the counter-intuitive phenomenon that residential segregation between individuals of different groups can emerge even when all involved individuals are tolerant.…
We study the design of decision-making mechanism for resource allocations over a multi-agent system in a dynamic environment. Agents' privately observed preference over resources evolves over time and the population is dynamic due to the…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…