Related papers: Rationalizable Behavior in the Hotelling Model wit…

The airport game is a classical and well-known model of fair cost-sharing for a single facility among multiple agents. This paper extends it to the so-called assignment setting, that is, for multiple facilities and agents, each agent…

The classical Hotelling game is played on a line segment whose points represent uniformly distributed clients. The $n$ players of the game are servers who need to place themselves on the line segment, and once this is done, each client gets…

Consider an M/M/1-type queue where joining attains a known reward, but a known waiting cost is paid per time unit spent queueing. In the 1960s, Naor showed that any arrival optimally joins the queue if its length is less than a known…

We study the impact of strategic behavior in labor markets characterized by algorithmic monoculture, where firms compete for a shared pool of applicants using a common algorithmic evaluation. In this setting, "naive" hiring strategies lead…

We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of customers choose their arrival time with the goal of…

The paper deals with a class of parametrized equilibrium problems, where the objectives of the players do possess nonsmooth terms. The respective Nash equilibria can be characterized via a parameter-dependent variational inequality of the…

This paper studies a spatial competition game between two firms that sell a homogeneous good at some pre-determined fixed price. A population of consumers is spread out over the real line, and the two firms simultaneously choose location in…

We consider a Markovian clearing queueing system, where the customers are accumulated according to a Poisson arrival process and the server removes all present customers at the completion epochs of exponential service cycles. This system…

Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also interested in…

This paper studies a duopoly investment model with uncertainty. There are two alternative irreversible investments. The first firm to invest gets a monopoly benefit for a specified period of time. The second firm to invest gets information…

Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…

A two-sided matching system is considered, where servers are assumed to arrive at a fixed rate, while the arrival rate of customers is modulated via a price-control mechanism. We analyse a loss model, wherein customers who are not served…

We consider the explicit introduction of firms' choice of location to Varian's model of sales for a two-stage spatial competition model based on a standard Hotelling's linear city model. This model is the formalization of Varian's model of…

We analyse a non-cooperative game between two competing ride-hailing platforms, each of which is modeled as a two-sided queueing system, where drivers (with a limited level of patience) are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process…

Models of spatial firm competition assume that customers are distributed in space and transportation costs are associated with their purchases of products from a small number of firms that are also placed at definite locations. It has been…

Dynamic facility location problems predominantly suppose a monopoly over the service or product provided. Nonetheless, this premise can be a severe oversimplification in the presence of market competitors, as customers may prefer facilities…

We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…

We consider a discrete population of users with homogeneous service demand who need to decide when to arrive to a system in which the service rate deteriorates linearly with the number of users in the system. The users have heterogeneous…

We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best…

In most service systems, the servers are humans who desire to experience a certain level of idleness. In call centers, this manifests itself as the call avoidance behavior, where servers strategically adjust their service rate to strike a…