Related papers: Rationalizable Behavior in the Hotelling Model wit…
This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination…
Although behavioral economics has demonstrated that there are many situations where rational choice is a poor empirical model, it has so far failed to provide quantitative models of economic problems such as price formation. We make a step…
We study competition between firms that contract with consumers before the consumers fully learn their product preferences. In a Hotelling duopoly, firms screen consumers by offering menus of option contracts. We characterize the unique…
We propose a strategy for modeling the behavior of an adiabatic quantum computer described by an Ising Hamiltonian with $N$ sites and the coordination number $Z$. The method is based on the $1/Z$ expansion for the density matrix of the…
We study the problem of pricing under a Multinomial Logit model where we incorporate network effects over the consumer's decisions. We analyse both cases, when sellers compete or collaborate. In particular, we pay special attention to the…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium strategies in an M/M/1 queue under dynamic service control. The service rate switches between a low and a high value depending on system congestion. Arriving customers do not observe the…
Denied boarding in congested transit systems induces queuing delays and departure-time shifts that can reshape passenger flows. Correctly modeling these responses in transit assignment hinges on the enforcement of two priority rules:…
Reverse pricing has been recognized as an effective tool to handle demand uncertainty in the travel industry (e.g., airlines and hotels). To investigate its viability for communication networks, we study the practical limitations of…
We study optimal execution in markets with transient price impact in a competitive setting with $N$ traders. Motivated by prior negative results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, we consider randomized strategies for the traders and…
The facility location with strategic agents is a canonical problem in the literature on mechanism design without money. Recently, Agrawal et. al. considered this problem in the context of machine learning augmented algorithms, where the…
We consider the problem of scheduling a queueing system in which many statistically identical servers cater to several classes of impatient customers. Service times and impatience clocks are exponential while arrival processes are renewal.…
We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest…
Chance-constrained correlated equilibrium enables coordination of noncooperative agents under cost uncertainty through probabilistic incentive-compatibility guarantees. However, computing such equilibria becomes intractable in large-scale…
We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market, with uncertainty in demand and local…
We consider the problem of selfish agents in discrete-time queuing systems, where competitive queues try to get their packets served. In this model, a queue gets to send a packet each step to one of the servers, which will attempt to serve…
While game theory has been transformative for decision-making, the assumptions made can be overly restrictive in certain instances. In this work, we investigate some of the underlying assumptions of rationality, such as mutual consistency…
We propose a general class of symmetric games called position-optimization games. Given a probability distribution $Q$ over a set of targets $\mathcal{Y}$, the $n$ players each choose a position in a space $\mathcal{X}$. A player's utility…
An existing challenge in power systems is the implementation of optimal demand management through dynamic pricing. This paper encompasses the design, analysis and implementation of a novel on-line pricing scheme based on coalitional game…
Congestion game is a widely used model for modern networked applications. A central issue in such applications is that the selfish behavior of the participants may result in resource overloading and negative externalities for the system…
Power system operators and electric utility companies often impose a coincident peak demand charge on customers when the aggregate system demand reaches its maximum. This charge incentivizes customers to strategically shift their peak usage…