Related papers: A New Value for Cooperative Games on Intersection-…
In simple games, larger coalitions typically wield more power, but do all players align their efforts effectively? Consider a voting scenario where a coalition forms, but needs more voters to pass a bill. The cohesion of the new group of…
Direct reciprocity is a well-known mechanism that could explain how cooperation emerges and prevails in an evolving population. Numerous prior researches have studied the emergence of cooperation in multiplayer games. However, most of them…
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy efficiency. Despite their desirable normative properties, this…
A solution concept on a class of transferable utility coalitional games is a multifunction satisfying given criteria of economic rationality. Every solution associates a set of payoff allocations with a coalitional game. This general…
In this paper we introduce a new class of cooperative games that arise from production-inventory problems. Several agents have to cover their demand over a finite time horizon and shortages are allowed. Each agent has its own unit…
Shapley values, which were originally designed to assign attributions to individual players in coalition games, have become a commonly used approach in explainable machine learning to provide attributions to input features for black-box…
The matching game is a cooperative game where the value of every coalition is the maximum revenue of players in the coalition can make by forming pairwise disjoint partners. The multiple partners matching game generalizes the matching game…
Cooperative games can be distinguished as non-cooperative games in which players can freely sign binding agreements to form coalitions. These coalitions inherit a joint strategy set and seek to maximize collective payoffs. When the payoffs…
Shapley value is a classic notion from game theory, historically used to quantify the contributions of individuals within groups, and more recently applied to assign values to data points when training machine learning models. Despite its…
The range of a payoff function for an $n$-player finite strategic game is investigated using a novel approach, the notion of extreme points of a non-convex set. The shape of a noncooperative payoff region can be estimated using extreme…
The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected accumulated worth of a random partition of the players. This…
The Shapley value (SV) and Least core (LC) are classic methods in cooperative game theory for cost/profit sharing problems. Both methods have recently been proposed as a principled solution for data valuation tasks, i.e., quantifying the…
Despite many distributed resource allocation (DRA) algorithms have been reported in literature, it is still unknown how to allocate the resource optimally over multiple interacting coalitions. One major challenge in solving such a problem…
The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every…
The purpose of this study is to propose a model that predicts the social and psychological factors that affect the individuals collaborative learning outcome in group projects. The model is established on the basis of two theories, namely,…
Cooperation in large groups and one-shot interactions is often hindered by freeloading. Punishment can enforce cooperation, but it is usually regarded as wasteful because the costs of punishing offset its benefits. Here, we analyze an…
We describe a mechanism to create fair and explainable incentives for software developers to reward contributions to security of a product. We use cooperative game theory to model the actions of the developer team inside a risk management…
We introduce the component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for network games. This new value being a convex combination of the Myerson value and the component-wise equal division rule is a player-based allocation rule. In network games under…
The Egalitarian Allocation (EA) is a well-known profit sharing method for cooperative games which attempts to distribute profit among participants in a most equal way while respecting the individual contributions to the obtained profit.…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…