Related papers: A New Value for Cooperative Games on Intersection-…
Objective: The study investigates the effect on cooperation in multiplayer games, when the population from which all individuals are drawn is structured - i.e. when a given individual is only competing with a small subset of the entire…
Parity games have witnessed several new quasi-polynomial algorithms since the breakthrough result of Calude et al. (STOC 2017). The combinatorial object underlying these approaches is a universal tree, as identified by Czerwi\'nski et al.…
Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection of…
We study continuity properties of stochastic game problems with respect to various topologies on information structures, defined as probability measures characterizing a game. We will establish continuity properties of the value function…
This paper studies allocation mechanisms in max-flow games with players' capacities as private information. We first show that no core-selection mechanism is truthful: there may exist a player whose payoff increases if she under-reports her…
In cooperative game theory, the primary focus is the equitable allocation of payoffs or costs among agents. However, in the practical applications of cooperative games, accurately representing games is challenging. In such cases, using an…
A large branch of explainable machine learning is grounded in cooperative game theory. However, research indicates that game-theoretic explanations may mislead or be hard to interpret. We argue that often there is a critical mismatch…
We study the mechanism design problem of allocating a set of indivisible items without monetary transfers. Despite the vast literature on this very standard model, it still remains unclear how do truthful mechanisms look like. We focus on…
We consider a multi-organizational system in which each organization contributes processors to the global pool but also jobs to be processed on the common resources. The fairness of the scheduling algorithm is essential for the stability…
Attribution scores can be applied in data management to quantify the contribution of individual items to conclusions from the data, as part of the explanation of what led to these conclusions. In Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning,…
Correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974) generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Aumann showed an example of a game, and of a correlated equilibrium in this game, in which the agents' surplus (expected sum of payo s) is…
We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in…
One of the practical applications of cooperative transferable utility games involves determining the fee structure for users of a given facility, whose construction or maintenance costs need to be recouped. In this context, certain…
In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretical formulation for a specific form of collaborative industrial relations called "Industrial Symbiotic Relation (ISR) games" and provide a formal framework to model, verify, and support…
We study the computational complexity of finding stable outcomes in hedonic games, which are a class of coalition formation games. We restrict our attention to symmetric additively-separable hedonic games, which are a nontrivial subclass of…
Incomplete cooperative games generalise the classical model of cooperative games by omitting the values of some of the coalitions. This allows to incorporate uncertainty into the model and study the underlying games as well as possible…
We consider concurrent games played on graphs. At every round of a game, each player simultaneously and independently selects a move; the moves jointly determine the transition to a successor state. Two basic objectives are the safety…
Evolutionary games on networks traditionally involve the same game at each interaction. Here we depart from this assumption by considering mixed games, where the game played at each interaction is drawn uniformly at random from a set of two…
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni- tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using…
We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…