Related papers: A New Value for Cooperative Games on Intersection-…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
In the context of blockchain, MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production through the inclusion, exclusion, or reordering of transactions. Searchers often participate in order flow auctions (OFAs) to obtain…
As data emerges as a vital driver of technological and economic advancements, a key challenge is accurately quantifying its value in algorithmic decision-making. The Shapley value, a well-established concept from cooperative game theory,…
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share "welfare" (cost or revenue) among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee the existence of a (pure) Nash equilibrium in this…
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in different types of two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules -- the replicator dynamics (RD), the…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
In cooperative game theory, games in partition function form are real-valued function on the set of so-called embedded coalitions, that is, pairs $(S,\pi)$ where $S$ is a subset (coalition) of the set $N$ of players, and $\pi$ is a…
We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception introduced a bargaining solution that minimises the maximal quantified ``propensity to disrupt'' the negotiation process of the…
We consider manipulations in the context of coalitional games, where a coalition aims to increase the total payoff of its members. An allocation rule is immune to coalitional manipulation if no coalition can benefit from internal…
Following the original interpretation of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) as a priori evaluation of the prospects of a player in a multi-person interaction situation, we propose a group value, which we call the Shapley group value, as a…
We propose the study of computing the Shapley value for a new class of cooperative games that we call budgeted games, and investigate in particular knapsack budgeted games, a version modeled after the classical knapsack problem. In these…
In this note, we consider repeated play of a finite game using learning rules whose period-by-period behavior probabilities or empirical distributions converge to some notion of equilibria of the stage game. Our primary focus is on…
We develop value iteration-based algorithms to solve in a unified manner different classes of combinatorial zero-sum games with mean-payoff type rewards. These algorithms rely on an oracle, evaluating the dynamic programming operator up to…
In this work, we examine a sequential setting of a cooperative game in which players arrive dynamically to form coalitions and complete tasks either together or individually, depending on the value created. Upon arrival, a new player as a…
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction…
Motivated by the markets operating on fast time scales, we present a framework for online coalitional games with time-varying coalitional values and propose real-time payoff distribution mechanisms. Specifically, we design two online…
Not all real-world data are labeled, and when labels are not available, it is often costly to obtain them. Moreover, as many algorithms suffer from the curse of dimensionality, reducing the features in the data to a smaller set is often of…
Designing fair compensation mechanisms for demand response (DR) is challenging. This paper models the problem in a game theoretic setting and designs a payment distribution mechanism based on the Shapley Value. As exact computation of the…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
Despite the increasing popularity and successful examples of crowdsourcing, it is stripped of aureole when collective efforts are derailed or severely hindered by elaborate sabotage. A service exchange dilemma arises when non-cooperation…