Related papers: Bundled School Choice
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the…
We consider a school choice matching model where the priorities for schools are represented by binary relations that may not be weak order. We focus on the (total order) extensions of the binary relations. We introduce a class of algorithms…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
In management education programmes today, students face a difficult time in choosing electives as the number of electives available are many. As the range and diversity of different elective courses available for selection have increased,…
We study the problem of selecting the top-k candidates from a pool of applicants, where each candidate is associated with a score indicating his/her aptitude. Depending on the specific scenario, such as job search or college admissions,…
We study the problem of aggregating individual preferences over alternatives into a collective ranking. A distinctive feature of our setting is that agents are matched to alternatives. Applications include rankings of colleges or academic…
A classic trade-off that school districts face when deciding which matching algorithm to use is that it is not possible to always respect both priorities and preferences. The student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) respects…
A methodology is presented to rank universities on the basis of the lists of programmes the students applied for. We exploit a crucial feature of the centralised assignment system to higher education in Hungary: a student is admitted to the…
In this paper, we study university admissions under a centralized system that uses grades and standardized test scores to match applicants to university programs. We consider affirmative action policies that seek to increase the number of…
The Deferred Acceptance algorithm is a popular school allocation mechanism thanks to its strategy proofness. However, with application costs, strategy proofness fails, leading to an identification problem. In this paper, I address this…
In the era of modern education, addressing cross-school learner diversity is crucial, especially in personalized recommender systems for elective course selection. However, privacy concerns often limit cross-school data sharing, which…
The matching literature often recommends market centralization under the assumption that agents know their own preferences and that their preferences are fixed. We find counterevidence to this assumption in a quasi-experiment. In Germany's…
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges…
We study the course allocation problem, where universities assign course schedules to students. The current state-of-the-art mechanism, Course Match, has one major shortcoming: students make significant mistakes when reporting their…
In recent years, bundle recommendation systems have gained significant attention in both academia and industry due to their ability to enhance user experience and increase sales by recommending a set of items as a bundle rather than…
We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are…
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these…
Prevailing methods of course allocation at undergraduate institutions involve reserving seats to give priority to designated groups of students. We introduce a competitive equilibrium-based mechanism that assigns course seats using student…
The prevalence of e-learning systems and on-line courses has made educational material widely accessible to students of varying abilities and backgrounds. There is thus a growing need to accommodate for individual differences in e-learning…
We present our experimental results of simulating the school choice problem which deals with the assignment of students to schools based on each group's complete preference list for the other group using two algorithms: Boston mechanism and…