Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities
Theoretical Economics
2023-08-29 v1 Computer Science and Game Theory
Abstract
We investigate the allocation of children to childcare facilities and propose solutions to overcome limitations in the current allocation mechanism. We introduce a natural preference domain and a priority structure that address these setbacks, aiming to enhance the allocation process. To achieve this, we present an adaptation of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism to our problem, which ensures strategy-proofness within our preference domain and yields the student-optimal stable matching. Finally, we provide a maximal domain for the existence of stable matchings using the properties that define our natural preference domain. Our results have practical implications for allocating indivisible bundles with complementarities.
Keywords
Cite
@article{arxiv.2308.14689,
title = {Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities},
author = {Ata Atay and Antonio Romero-Medina},
journal= {arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.14689},
year = {2023}
}