Related papers: Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Post…
Crowdsourcing has emerged as a paradigm for leveraging human intelligence and activity to solve a wide range of tasks. However, strategic workers will find enticement in their self-interest to free-ride and attack in a crowdsourcing contest…
Recent scholarly work has extensively examined the phenomenon of algorithmic collusion driven by AI-enabled pricing algorithms. However, online platforms commonly deploy recommender systems that influence how consumers discover and purchase…
This paper examines bid requirements, where the government may cancel a procurement contract unless two or more bids are received. Using a first-price auction model with endogenous entry, we compare the bid requirement and reserve price…
This paper considers the problem of steering the aggregative behavior of a population of noncooperative price-taking agents towards a desired behavior. Different from conventional pricing schemes where the price is fully available for…
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms…
When online sellers use AI learning algorithms to automatically compete on e-commerce platforms, there is concern that they will learn to coordinate on higher than competitive prices. However, this concern was primarily raised in…
We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers' information structure about the common value. We use linear…
Collaborative machine learning (ML) is an appealing paradigm to build high-quality ML models by training on the aggregated data from many parties. However, these parties are only willing to share their data when given enough incentives,…
Posted price mechanisms are prevalent in allocating goods within online marketplaces due to their simplicity and practical efficiency. We explore a fundamental scenario where buyers' valuations are independent and identically distributed,…
A diffusion auction refers to a selling process conducted over a social network, where each participant submits a bid and may invite other potential buyers to join the auction. Although various mechanisms have been proposed, none of them…
In this paper, we study the problem of cost optimisation of individual-based institutional incentives (reward, punishment, and hybrid) for guaranteeing a certain minimal level of cooperative behaviour in a well-mixed, finite population. In…
Blockchains rely on economic incentives to ensure secure and decentralised operation, making incentive compatibility a core design concern. However, protocols are rarely deployed in isolation. Applications interact with the underlying…
In this work, using a game-theoretic approach, cost-sensitive mechanisms that lead to reliable Internet-based computing are designed. In particular, we consider Internet-based master-worker computations, where a master processor assigns,…
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game…
We study the design of mechanisms -- e.g., auctions -- when the designer does not control information flows between mechanism participants. A mechanism equilibrium is leakage-proof if no player conditions their actions on leaked…
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total…
We study online combinatorial auctions with production costs proposed by Blum et al. using the online primal dual framework. In this model, buyers arrive online, and the seller can produce multiple copies of each item subject to a…
Ecosystems enjoy increasing attention due to their flexibility and innovative power. It is well known, however, that this type of network-based economic governance structures occupies a potentially unstable position between the two stable…
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…