Related papers: Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Post…
We consider the coupled dynamics of the adaption of network structure and the evolution of strategies played by individuals occupying the network vertices. We propose a computational model in which each agent plays a $n$-round Prisoner's…
In the quest for market mechanisms that are easy to implement, yet close to optimal, few seem as viable as posted pricing. Despite the growing body of impressive results, the performance of most posted price mechanisms however, rely…
Recent antitrust regulations in several countries have granted exemptions for collusion aimed at achieving environmental goals. Firms can apply for exemptions if collusion helps to develop or to implement costly clean technology,…
In railway infrastructure, construction and maintenance is typically procured using competitive procedures such as auctions. However, these procedures only fulfill their purpose - using (taxpayers') money efficiently - if bidders do not…
Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction…
We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…
In the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, a common approach is to enforce incentive compatibility as constraints in programs that optimize over feasible mechanisms. Such constraints are often imposed on sparsified representations of…
We analyze the delegation of pricing by participants, representing firms, to a collusive, self-learning algorithm in a repeated Bertrand experiment. In the baseline treatment, participants set prices themselves. In the other treatments,…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…
In the study of the evolution of cooperation, many mechanisms have been proposed to help overcome the self-interested cheating that is individually optimal in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. These mechanisms include assortative or networked…
Algorithmic pricing is increasingly shaping market competition, raising concerns about its potential to compromise competitive dynamics. While prior work has shown that reinforcement learning (RL)-based pricing algorithms can lead to tacit…
In applications such as participatory sensing and crowd sensing, self-interested agents exert costly effort towards achieving an objective for the system operator. We study such a setup where a principal incentivizes multiple agents of…
In this paper, we rigorously study the problem of cost optimisation of hybrid (mixed) institutional incentives, which are a plan of actions involving the use of reward and punishment by an external decision-maker, for maximising the level…
We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…
This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning systems, the actions of one agent can have a negative impact on the rewards of other agents. One way to combat this problem is to let agents trade their rewards amongst each other. Motivated by this,…
The popular generalized second price (GSP) auction for sponsored search is built upon a separable model of click-through-rates that decomposes the likelihood of a click into the product of a "slot effect" and an "advertiser effect" --- if…
Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and indirect reciprocity, where individuals cooperate to build a positive reputation for future benefits, plays a key role in promoting it. Previous theoretical and experimental studies have…
This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…
Shill bidding occurs when fake bids are introduced into an auction on the seller's behalf in order to artificially inflate the final price. This is typically achieved by the seller having friends bid in her auctions, or the seller controls…