Related papers: Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Post…

We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as {\em capacitated} and seek mechanisms that maximize social welfare and are simultaneously incentive…

We consider the design of experiments to evaluate treatments that are administered by self-interested agents, each seeking to achieve the highest evaluation and win the experiment. For example, in an advertising experiment, a company wishes…

Consider sellers in a competitive market that use algorithms to adapt their prices from data that they collect. In such a context it is plausible that algorithms could arrive at prices that are higher than the competitive prices and this…

Information sharing among organizations has been gaining attention as a method for improving cybersecurity. However, the associated disclosure costs act as deterrents for firms' voluntary cooperation. In this work, we take a game-theoretic…

The threat of algorithmic collusion, and whether it merits regulatory intervention, remains debated, as existing evaluations of its emergence often rely on long learning horizons, assumptions about counterparty rationality in adopting…

We explore the performance of polynomial-time incentive-compatible mechanisms in single-crossing domains. Single-crossing domains were extensively studied in the economics literature. Roughly speaking, a domain is single crossing if…

In repeated games, such as auctions, players rely on autonomous learning agents to choose their actions. We study settings in which players have their agents make monetary transfers to other agents during play at their own expense, in order…

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for trading networks that satisfy four desired properties: dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, efficiency, weak budget balance (WBB), and individual rationality (IR). Although there exist…

We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…

This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her…

We design a fixed-price auction mechanism for a seller to sell multiple items in a tree-structured market. The buyers have independently drawn valuation from a uniform distribution, and the seller would like to incentivize buyers to invite…

We consider a simple model of rational agents competing in a single product market described by simple linear demand curve. Contrary to accepted economic theory, the agents' production levels synchronise in the absence of conscious…

We study a mechanism-design problem in which spiteful agents strive to not only maximize their rewards but also, contingent upon their own payoff levels, seek to lower the opponents' rewards. We characterize all individually rational (IR)…

Econometric inference allows an analyst to back out the values of agents in a mechanism from the rules of the mechanism and bids of the agents. This paper gives an algorithm to solve the problem of inferring the values of agents in a…

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…

Peer prediction mechanisms are often adopted to elicit truthful contributions from crowd workers when no ground-truth verification is available. Recently, mechanisms of this type have been developed to incentivize effort exertion, in…

In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…

In this paper, we consider a general distributed system with multiple agents who select and then implement actions in the system. The system has an operator with a centralized objective. The agents, on the other hand, are selfinterested and…

Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…

We consider dynamic pricing schemes in online settings where selfish agents generate online events. Previous work on online mechanisms has dealt almost entirely with the goal of maximizing social welfare or revenue in an auction settings.…