Related papers: Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Comple…
The Stable Roommates problem involves matching a set of agents into pairs based on the agents' strict ordinal preference lists. The matching must be stable, meaning that no two agents strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. A…
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on stable partitions, we extend his results to this significantly…
Two-sided popular matchings in bipartite graphs are a well-known generalization of stable matchings in the marriage setting, and they are especially relevant when preference lists are incomplete. In this case, the cardinality of a stable…
We introduce a new two-sided stable matching problem that describes the summer internship matching practice of an Australian university. The model is a case between two models of Kamada and Kojima on matchings with distributional…
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to…
Efficient computability is an important property of solution concepts in matching markets. We consider the computational complexity of finding and verifying various solution concepts in trading networks-multi-sided matching markets with…
This paper develops a method to use singles' data in a non-parametric revealed preference setting of collective household choice. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference stability between singles and couples, without…
Self-stabilization is a strong property that guarantees that a network always resume correct behavior starting from an arbitrary initial state. Weaker guarantees have later been introduced to cope with impossibility results: probabilistic…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
We describe new methods for deciding the stability of switching systems. The methods build on two ideas previously appeared in the literature: the polytope norm iterative construction, and the lifting procedure. Moreover, the combination of…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
Several countries successfully use centralized matching schemes for school or higher education assignment, or for entry-level labour markets. In this paper we explore the computational aspects of a possible similar scheme for assigning…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The 2-sets convex feasibility problem aims at finding a point in the intersection of two closed convex sets $A$ and $B$ in a normed space $X$. More generally, we can consider the problem of finding (if possible) two points in $A$ and $B$,…
The Balanced Stable Marriage problem is a central optimization version of the classic Stable Marriage problem. Here, the output cannot be an arbitrary stable matching, but one that balances between the dissatisfaction of the two parties,…
Motivated by questions in robust control and switched linear dynamical systems, we consider the problem checking whether all convex combinations of k matrices in R^{n x n} are stable. In particular, we are interested whether there exist…
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants. Both institutes and applicants have preferences…
Let G = ((A,B),E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching. Popular…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…